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I. INTRODUCTION
he question of the proper scope of judicial power remains theTsubject of one of the most contentious and long-standing
debates in American constitutional theory. The core of this
debate centers around the question of the legitimacy of the more expansive
or "activist" conceptions of the judicial role in American constitutional
government, and in one form or another it dates back to the very writing
and ratification of the Constitution.' The question is also a highly contro-
versial one because of its close link to the legitimacy of a number of
particular Supreme Court decisions associatedwith divisive issues, such as
abortion.2 Indeed, this judicial role question, as it relates to individual
constitutional rights, can fairly be said to have been the single dominant
issue in our constitutional discourse since at least the early 1960s.
3
Theoretical inquiries into this question have obviously been driven chiefly
by the decisional practices of the Supreme Court, and it was, notably, the
Warren Court that first sparked the debate in its contemporary form.
4
Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court continues today to hand down
and reaffirm decisions that are quite controversial from a judicial power
perspective ensures that the question of the proper judicial role remains an
important and timely subject of inquiry.5
I See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Brutus, Essays of
Brutus, reprintedin THEANTI-FEDERALIST 162, 162-87 (Herbert Storing ed., 1985)
(1787-1788).
2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 148-73
(2d ed. 1994, rev. by Sanford Levinson); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, AHISTORY OFTHE
SUPREME COURT 263-85 (1993).
4 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 69-100 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
1 See, e.g, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating a law
prohibiting the "partial-birth" or "dilation and extraction" abortion procedure). The
Court's federalism jurisprudence and its decisions relating to the limits on
Congress's section 5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment have
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Indeed, the Court's 1999-2000 Term-with its high number of
controversial decisions as well as its display of deep ideological divisions
and partisan rancor among the justices-has especially underscored the
continuing importance of the question of the proper limits of judicial
power. For instance, quite prominent legal commentators, from both the
moderate right and the moderate left, maintain that the Court's most recent
term evinced a particularly pronounced tendency to engage in more
questionable exercises ofjudicial review.6 More specifically, commentators
criticized the justices for their excessive partisanship, results-oriented
judging, lack of respect for the dignity and authority of the law, political
"feuding," and constituency-serving, as well as for their "hubris,"
"arrogance," "contempt for the competing views of the political branches,"
and improper "strategic concern for [the Court's] own institutional
prerogatives."' Even more recently, in the 2000-2001 Term, the Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore9 has led to a new wave of concern among jurists
about the dangers ofjudicial overreaching.10 Plainly, these observations are
illustrative of our ongoing theoretical and practical concern about the
function of the judiciary in the American system of government, particu-
larly the question of the legitimacy of a highly political, ideologically-
charged, and aggressive exercise of judicial review.
It is also worth noting, then, that while the Supreme Court's recent
decisions may have provided, quite arguably, some especially egregious
examples of questionable judicial behavior, this sort ofjudicial (mis)con-
duct and these sorts of charges against the Supreme Court are scarcely a
new phenomenon in American political life. As recently as the 1960s, the
Supreme Court's willingness to engage in controversial judicial policy-
making seemed to reach an all-time high, as had criticism of the Supreme
Court for asserting such expansive conceptions of its own power." Even
also raised new issues involving the relationship of the judicial role to judicial
enforcement of structural constitutional norms. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6 See Jeremy Rabkin, A Supreme Mess at the Supreme Court, WKLY.
STANDARD, July 17, 2000, at 24; Jeffrey Rosen, Pride and Prejudice, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, July 10 & 17,2000, at 16.
7 Rabkin, supra note 6.
8Rosen, supra note 6.
9Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
10 Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace: The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 25,2000, at 16-18.
" On the Warren Court, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 263-85. Schwartz
observes that the Supreme Court in this era "perform[6d] a transforming role,
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much earlier, at the turn of the last century, the Court's controversial
policy-making on economic issues brought down an avalanche of criticism
from the political left, including both the highly influential populist and
progressive movements." In light of this long history, there is no reason to
suppose that our (often acrimonious) debates about the proper judicial role
will end anytime in the foreseeable future; rather, they will remain a
permanent part of our discussions concerning constitutional law and
government.
A question, therefore both timely and relatively timeless, continues to
arise with each new judicial Term and demands further serious analysis.
The most common understanding of this question is formulated as follows:
Does an "activist" exercise of judicial review--one that is controversial,
politically charged, aggressive, and only loosely grounded in traditional
legal materials-constitute a "legitimate" use of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court or, rather, is such an exercise an "abuse" of that power?13
This Article endeavors to provide an answer to this question, building
on a new line of "structural interpretive" constitutional analysis developed
in an earlier article. 4 This approach takes the basic-and often rather
usually thought of as more appropriate to the legislator than the judge." Id. at 263
(emphasis added).
" Onthis era, see WILLIAM G. Ross, MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PRoGRESSIvEs,
ANDLABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS 1890-1937 (1994).
13 The language of "legitimacy" and "abuse," often obscure in its basis and
implications, is regularly used in this context, rather than the language of
"illegality" or "unconstitutionality." This is because the debate about the scope of
judicial power is routinely conceived to be a largely moral and political debate
about the "justifications" for judicial review, rather than a more constrained legal-
historical constitutional debate about the proper scope of judicial power under
Article III of the Constitution. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTITrrIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 106-08 (1996) (noting that the
question of the legitimacy of judicial review is typically treated as a question of
abstract moral philosophy or political prudence rather than one of constitutional
interpretation). For an example of this moral-political approach, see ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 14-28 (1962). For an example ofa legal-historical approach, see GEORGE
CAREY, IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 122-38 (rev. and expanded ed. 1995).
14 See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Review: A
StructuralInterpretive-Approach, 52 OKLA.L. REV. 521 (1999)(arguing in part that
the debate about judicial interpretive theory should be re-conceived as a debate
about the interpretation of the structure of the Constitution and the Constitution's
allocation of authority to the Supreme Court).
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abstract-moral-political question of the "legitimacy" of a particular
conception of judicial power and re-conceives it as essentially a legal
question of the constitutional legitimacy or structural constitutionality of
an exercise of judicial power in light of the constraints of the American
constitutional design. This method thus provides an answer in the slightly
different but closely-related form ofan analysis ofthe proper constitutional
scope and limits of the judicial power implicit in the Constitution's design
for government. This shifts the argument from a largely moral, political,
and philosophical discussion to a primarily legal, constitutional, and
interpretive discussion about the meaning ofthe Constitution's governmen-
tal architecture and its allocation of power to the Supreme Court. 5
This Article thus seeks an answer to the question of the proper judicial
role through a careful structural interpretation of the governmental plan
established by the Constitution. This structural interpretive analysis
involves an analysis of the logic ofjudicial review,' 6 multiple variables of
judicial power, 7 and multiple fundamental constitutional principles in
tension with expansive judicial power." The analysis also recognizes the
importance of both the legal-historical (or "fit") and moral-political (or
'udgment") aspects of structural constitutional interpretation. 9 Ittherefore
involves a primary "legal fit" analysis centering around traditional sources
of law, as well as a secondary "moral judgment" analysis centering around
an assessment of which reading of the legal materials is more attractive as
a political matter. While this broad approach to the question of the proper
judicial role is, of course, by no means wholly new,2" it does synthesize a
number of commonly expressed concerns related to the judicial
power-such as the "logic" of judicial review and the "counter-
majoritarian"difficulty-into amore systematic, sophisticated, andholistic
account of the proper judicial function. It also places this account more
firmly and plainly in the crucial context of interpretingthe structure ofthe
"s Id. As noted below, even a legal-historical debate will have important moral-
political aspects, both in determining what legal materials to emphasize and how
they should be read in cases where their meaning is less than clear. See infra Part
nI.
'6 Nowlin, supra note 14, at 546-49. See also infra Part VII.C.1.
'Nowlin, supra note 14, at 542-45. See also infra Part VII.C.2.
,sNowlin, supra note 14, at 549-53. See also infra Parts III and VII.B.
'9 Nowlin, supra note 14, at 554-62. See also infra Parts IV and V.
20Nowlin, supra note 14, at 526-29 (discussing jurists such as Robert Bork,
Frank Easterbrook, John Hart Ely, and Alexander Bickel, whose work contains
elements of a structural interpretive approach to questions of judicial power).
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Constitution to determine the parameters of a constitutionally legitimate
exercise of the power of judicial review.
This Article, as part of an on-going project, concentrates on the narrow
issue of the (primary) legal-historical aspect of structural constitutional
interpretation. It asks--in light of the logic ofjudicial review, the multiple
variables of judicial power, and the multiple constitutional principles in
tension with expansive judicial power--on what legal-historical grounds
can one justify an expansive conception of judicial power as a structural
reading of the Constitution.21 Therefore, in determining the constitutional
legitimacy of expansive judicial power, this innovative structural interpre-
tive approach leads one to ask a number of more pointed "structural
interpretive" questions. What basis is there in the constitutional text for a
reading ofthe constitutional design that includes an "expansive" allocation
of power to the judiciary? What basis is there in the range of original
structural understandings of the text for this same proposition? What basis
in our original or early constitutional traditions? What basis in later,
innovative, evolving constitutional traditions?
Part ofthis analysis involves asking, further, the question ofwhat these
sources of law may tell us about the logic of judicial review, the multiple
variables of judicial power, and the multiple fundamental constitutional
principles in facial conflict with expansive judicial power. Moreover, one
must also ask what weight should be given in determining the constitu-
tional limits of the judicial power to such traditional sources of law as text,
original understanding, and constitutional traditions. What interpretive
methodologies, then, would one use to establish the meaning of the
contours ofthe American constitutional design? Finally, what influence, if
any, should be given to the widely-recognized "populist" or "popular
sovereignty" basis ofthe U.S. Constitution in determining the weight to be
accorded various sources of law in our structural interpretation of the
constitutional design?
This Article's line of analysis will therefore involve several inquiries.
It will first be necessary to clarify what is meant by "expansive judicial
power" and to compare it to an alternative understanding of the proper
judicial role. It will also be necessary to discuss the way in which the
question of the proper judicial role is a question both of constitutional
structure and constitutional interpretation-and thus one that must be
answered through a structural interpretation of the architecture of the
11 The primary legal-historical sources of law are text, original understanding,
and constitutional tradition in both its original and "evolving" forms. For a brief
treatment of this subject see id. at 553-58. See also infra Parts IV-V.
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government established by the Constitution. To that end, this Article also
discusses the manner in which one should draw on traditional sources of
law-such as text, historical context, and constitutional tradition-in
crafting an answer to the structural interpretive question of the proper
judicial role. From this discussion follows an analysis of the role that legal-
historical materials should play in structural interpretation, particularly in
light of the foundational political and constitutional norm of popular
sovereignty. Finally, this Article attempts a highly detailed analysis of each
of these authoritative sources of law--constitutional text, original
understanding and "original" constitutional practices, and later "innova-
tive" or "evolving"practices-as they relate to the constitutional limits of
judicial review.
This Article concludes that the constitutional limits of the judicial
power can be determined through the sort of robust structural interpretive
approach sketched above. This Article also concludes, more specifically,
that one should endorse what may be called a "populist" theory of
constitutional interpretation, one that gives great weight in structural
interpretation to those sources of law with the strongest "populist" or
popular sovereignty pedigrees: constitutional text, ratifier understanding,
long-standing constitutional practices, and innovative constitutional
practices evidencing long-standing, consensus-based popular support. As
will be demonstrated, such an analysis reveals that constitutional text,
original understanding, and original constitutional practice do not support
expansive judicial power and in fact lend strong support to constitutional
principles in clear and obvious tension with such judicial power-such as
separation of powers, federalism, andrepresentative democracy. Moreover,
this analysis also reveals that later constitutional traditions are divided on
the question of expansive judicial power and that a very expansive
conception ofthejudicial function remains highly controversial even today.
This last point, in turn, suggests that such a conception cannot be consid-
ered a new consensus-based popular "reinterpretation" of the American
constitutional design. On these grounds, then, this Article concludes that
expansive judicial power is, in fact, constitutionally illegitimate, that such
a conception of the judicial function exceeds the scope of power allocated
to the Supreme Court by the Constitution.
II. Two RIVAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PROPER JUDICIAL ROLE
Contemporary debates about judicial power center around two broad
rival visions of the proper role for courts in the American constitutional
design. What may be termed the judicial minimalist vision envisages a
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proper exercise of judicial review as one that is firmly grounded in
traditional legal materials, that minimizes the political discretion ofjudges,
that strives to be apolitical, that shows considerable deference to the
judgment of democratic political actors, and that results in a set of fairly
"thin" and consensus-based, judicially-enforceable constitutional normsP
Some ofthe most obvious exemplars ofthis view ofthejudicial role among
American judges would include Oliver Wendell Holmes, Learned Hand,
Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall Harlan III, and
William Rehnquist.3 Abroad definition ofminimalism would also include
originalist judges, such as Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia, who justify
judicial originalism primarily as a means of limiting judicial discretion and
preserving the contours of the constitutional design.24 Under this judicial
minimalist vision, greater discretionary political authority is exercised by
voters and their elected representatives in accordance with the constitu-
tional norms of representation, separation of powers, bicameralism,
presentment, and federalism. Less discretionary power, comparatively
speaking, is exercised by unelected federal judges, given the strict limits
this view places on more aggressive forms of judicial review. This
conception of the constitutional design might then also be fairly called a
"populist," "democratic," "republican," or "federalist" understanding.
Thejudicial maximalist vision, by contrast, envisages aproper exercise
of judicial review as one including decisions that are only very loosely
grounded in traditional legal materials, that involve substantial judicial
political discretion, that are politically-driven, that show only very little
deference to democratic political actors, and that result in a set of quite
"thick" and controversial constitutional norms. Some obvious exemplars
of this view among judges would include Earl Warren, William Brennan,
ThurgoodMarshall, and Harry Blackmun.' Under this judicial maximalist
' The definition of the "judicial minimalist" vision given here is essentially a
"judicial restraini' definition and differs substantially from that popularized by
Cass Sunstein. See CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-23 (1998).
2 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 117-129
(1994); SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 6-7; EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (expanded ed.
1988). See also infra Part VIII.D.2.
24 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 153-55; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37-47 (1998).
1 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); WHITE, supra note 23, at
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vision, much less discretionary political authority is exercised by voters
and their elected representatives, and considerably more discretionary
political authority is exercised by federal judges. This exercise of political
authority by the federal judiciary is in clear tension with constitutional
norms such as representation, separation of powers, bicameralism,
presentment, and federalism. This conception of the constitutional design
might also be called an "elitist," "centralist," "judge-centered," or perhaps
"juristocratic" 6 conception. As a starting point for analysis, these two
broad categories capture the most basic and important differences reflected
in contemporary debates about the proper understanding of the judicial
role. Even so, in pursuing an historical analysis, it is important to keep in
mind that these two categories also necessarily simplify what is in fact a
much more complex array of viewpoints involving a much larger number
of variables that differ in degree and proportion.
III. THE PRIMACY OF STRUCTURAL INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS
It should also be obvious as well that a view of the proper judicial role
does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is often simply the implicit logical
outgrowth of a wider set of assumptions about the American constitutional
design. This is especially true of the basic structural logic ofjudicial review
and the proper relation of the judicial function to fundamental constitu-
tional principles such as popular sovereignty, representative democracy,
separation of powers, and federalism. Of course, one's understanding of the
proper judicial role should reflect these norms of constitutional structure,
but should do so expressly, self-consciously, reflectively, and in a structural
interpretive context.27
In fact, one cannot really answer the question of what judges should
"do" about the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment until one has
336-42 (discussing Earl Warren). For one of the most cogent theoretical defenses
of this perspective, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
1 While the neologism "juristocratic" is something of a barbarism, it does serve
the useful purpose of denominating much more precisely than terms such as
"elitist" or "aristocratic" the tendency to support granting greater discretionary
political power to an elite class of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars as opposed
to ordinary voters and their representatives. See MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER:
ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH 89-145 (1998).
27 See Nowlin, supra note 14 (emphasizing the important constitutional nature
ofthe limits on the judicial power as opposed to mere moral, political, or prudential
limits).
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answeredamuch more fundamental, structural-interpretive question: What
is the proper role of courts within the American constitutional design,
including the legitimate scope and constitutional limits of the judicial
power? This approach to the question of the proper judicial function would
ask, in essence, whether the design ofthe Constitution can fairly be read as
granting "expansive" power to the Supreme Court or, by contrast, power
of some more limited degree. Therefore, this question of the limits of
judicial power, rightly understood, is a question of both constitutional
structure and constitutional interpretation. It thus requires a structural
interpretation of the American constitutional design, an attempt to discern
constitutional meaning as it relates to the distribution of power among the
institutions of government, which in turn requires careful consideration of
the Constitution's various structural strategies for protecting the rights of
individuals.
Indeed, the question of the proper judicial role is also, as a question of
constitutional interpretation, one logically antecedent to specific, second
order questions such as judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights or
Fourteenth Amendment.28 Indeed, one simply cannot decide, at least
properly so, howthe Supreme Court should interpret the Bill of Rights until
after one has considered the questions of the proper role of the judiciary in
the American constitutional design, of what the Court is properly "to do"
within the framework of government, and of the proper scope and
constitutional limits of the judicial power. A court can scarcely premise an
exercise ofthejudicial power on a particular conception of the judicial role
without first determining if that conception of the judicial role is itself
justified as a matter of structural constitutional interpretation. Moreover,
this question is not purely or even largely a matter ofprudence or political
philosophy, as so often has been assumed,29 for the obvious reason that the
Court may not exercise governmental power that exceeds the scope of the
limited powers granted to it by the Constitution. Therefore, the difficulties
of structural constitutional interpretation must be confronted and engaged
rather than avoided or circumvented, and one's moral-political judgments
about the judicial role must be placed in an interpretive context. As will be
described, any plausible interpretation ofthe constitutional design must be
firmly grounded in a "fit" analysis of traditional legal materials, and
28 See id. at 531-33.
9 See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 13, at 106-08 (observing that the question of
the legitimacy of judicial review is typically treated as a question of abstract moral
philosophy or political prudence).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
therefore a moral-political analysis must take a subordinate role to a legal-
historical one.30
Further, this structural interpretive question concerning the contours of
the properjudicial role is a much more fundamental constitutional question
than that of how judges should interpret a particular provision or structural
aspect of the Constitution. This is so because the former question itself
implicates a sweeping array of foundational constitutional principles-such
as popular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of powers,
checks and balances, and federalism.3' Though space constraints do not
permit a full analysis here, it may be noted that the Court's aggressive use
ofpolitically-charged (and, in substance, quasi-legislative) powerthreatens
the following constitutional norms: (1) popular sovereignty (by detaching
constitutional meaning from the will of the Ratifiers and constitutional
alteration from the Article V amendment process), (2) representative
democracy (by shiftingpolitical power from elected bodies to the unelected
court), (3) separation of powers (by shifting the functional equivalent of
legislative power from legislative bodies to the judicial branch), (4) checks
and balances (by, for instance, circumventing the requirement of present-
ment of a legislative act to the executive), (5) bicameralism (by shifting
legislative power from the bicameral Congress to the "unicameral" Court),
and (6) federalism (by shifting authority from the states to the national
government). It is also important to note here that the constitutional
principle of federalism incorporates a parallel set of constitutional
norms--including popular sovereignty, representation, and separation of
powers-into the American constitutional system, as these principles are
reflected in state constitutional designs.
It should be apparent, then, that the answer to the question ofthe proper
scope ofjudicial power has obvious wide-ranging and important repercus-
sions for the structure of American government. Indeed, constitutional
structure was the chief concern of the original Constitution and most of its
later amendments, and therefore a structural inquiry into the properjudicial
role must be considered a highly fundamental question of constitutional
interpretation. Moreover, while space constraints do not permit an
additional moral-political structural interpretive analysis to determine the
3See infra Parts IV-V.
31 See Nowlin, supra note 14, at 549-53 (discussing judicial minimalist and
maximalist understandings of the structure of the Constitution). For a valuable
discussion of these principles in action, see CAREY, supra note 13; PUBLIUS, THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS (John P.
Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989).
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precise nature and degree ofthe conflicts between expansive judicial power
and the multiple fundamental constitutional values outlined above, it is
highly unlikely that an aggressive, politically-charged, quasi-legislative
role for the Court can be understood as structurally supportive of, rather
than inimical to, these basic republican principles of government.
3 2
Additionally, it should be clear that the burden of reconciling these prima
facie conflicts lies with the proponents of expansive judicial power 3 This
Article therefore assumes the presence ofa high degree of conflict between
the traditional understanding of these principles and expansive judicial
power.
The answer to the structural interpretive question of the proper judicial
role must guide, shape, and constrain responses to subordinate questions
such as how judges should interpret the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment. In short, the question of the constitutional limits ofjudicial
review is a highly fundamental-even foundational-constitutional
question, and one that must be confronted and answered, as a matter of
structural constitutional interpretation, before one can determine the proper
interpretive methodologies forjudicial determination of other constitutional
questions.
IV. DETERMINING CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS:
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
A. The Basic Sources of Law
What, then, is the proper methodology for interpreting the American
constitutional design, in order to determine the proper constitutional role
32 see, e.g., BICKEL supra note 13, at 16-23 (discussing the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" posedby thetensionbetweenjudicial review and American
constitutional democracy); BORK, supra note 4, at 159 (discussing the conflict
between "judicial activism" and constitutional principles such as representative
democracy and separation of powers); Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique
of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993) (discussing the
conflict between a liberal conception of the person that involves a commitment to
participatory rights and judicial enforcement of a bill of rights trumping
participatory rights).
33 SeeNowlin, supra note 14, at560-561 (arguing that proponents of expansive
judicial power bear the burden of justification because expansive judicial power is
"on its face, elitist, anti-democratic, anti-republican, anti-populist, and anti-
federalist," and that it is also a recent and informal innovation in constitutional
practice).
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for courts and the constitutional limits of judicial review? As discussed
elsewhere, a full treatment of this important structural interpretive issue
would include both a legal-historical and moral-political interpretive
aspect?4 The former would consider the question of a conception's "fit"
with traditional legal materials and the latter would deal with which reading
of the legal materials is most attractive as a normative matter?' Both
aspects of structural interpretation would also pay careful attention to sub-
questions such as the structural logic of judicial review, the multiple
variables of judicial power, and the multiple structural constitutional
principles which the judicial power implicates?6 This Article limits itself
primarily to the question of legal-historical "fit," including the relevant
structural sub-questions. It also maintains that traditional legal materials
should chiefly govern answers to the question of the proper judicial role,
and therefore thatthe relevance of moral-political analysis to one's ultimate
conclusions is strictly limited in scope.
Initially, the relevance of legal-historical materials to the structural
interpretative enterprise must be established. The widely recognized legal-
historical sources of law are: (1) text, (2) contextual or "original" meaning,
and (3) precedent, including traditional governmental practices. What role
should text, original meaning, and traditional practice play inthe interpreta-
tion of the constitutional design? In common-sense fashion, Robert Dahl
once observed that:
The authority for judicial review is based on two general kinds of
arguments. The first is that judicial review is implied by the Constitution
[which Dahl determines by original intent], which is itself accepted as
legitimate; or at the very least, that judicial review rests on a long-standing
tradition that for all practical purposes incorporates it into the constitu-
tional system. This argumentmight be called the traditional constitutional-
ity ofjudicial review. It is a very strong argument, and to most Americans
concerned with the question, it seems to be convincing.37
34Id.
3S Cf RONALD DWORKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977) (discus-
sing a legal "fit" and moral "judgment" approach to legal interpretation).
36 See Nowlin, supra note 14, at 541-53 (discussing the necessity of a robust
structural interpretive approach that moves beyond the common concentration on
judicial interpretive theory and representative democracy to analysis of multiple
variables ofjudicial power and multiple structural principles in facial conflict with
expansive judicial power).
37 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND
PERFORMANCE 143 (3d ed. 1976). The second argument attempts to reconcile
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Of course, Dahl's inquiry is much narrower than the one undertaken
herein, which focuses on the proper role for courts in the constitutional
design (rather than simply the legitimacy ofjudicial review). Dahl's basic
point, however, would remain much the same: evidence of textual support,
original meaning, and long-standing tradition are generally widely-
recognized as providing a strong and convincing basis for the authority of
a particular conception of the judicial role, given their status as conven-
tional sources of law and their link to the political will of the people. In
fact, even Ronald Dworkin, a major advocate of the judicial use of moral
philosophy in constitutional interpretation, has himself seemingly rejected
wide-ranging"moral" readings of the American constitutional design. This
is apparent from his criticism of so-called "external revisionists"--those
who would draw on controversial democratic and republican theories in
determining the limits of the proper judicial role under the Constitution. 8
In any event, whether or not one agrees with Dahl's empirical point or
shares Dworkin's seeming rejection of a "moral" design reading, it is
certainly hard to imagine any plausible structural interpretive method that
would reject a strong reliance on the primary legal-historical sources of
law. Certainly, even if one were to advocate a broader "moral" reading of
the constitutional design, both common-sense and legal intuition suggest
that a proper structural interpretation would still require a legal-historical
"fit" analysis that implicates these conventional sources of law. In fact, this
common intuition likely reflects a sense that both (1) interpretation of the
Constitution, which itself is understood as a kind of law, must be linked to
conventional legal interpretation and thus to conventional sources of law;
and (2) interpretation of the Constitution, if it is not to devolve into a
wholly unstable form of "constitutional politics," must be grounded in
something more substantial than any particular interpreter's moral and
political preferences.
B. Popular Sovereignty as a Foundational Political Norm
The common intuition in favor ofa legal-historical approach also likely
reflects the fact that there are very good reasons, aside from concerns
judicial review with democracy. Id.
3 8 DWORKIN, sulpra note 25, at 74-76. Whether this criticism is consistent with
Dworkin's other views is, of course, another question. See Nowlin, supra note 14,
at 558-60 (noting the contradiction inherent in advocating a judicial "moral"
reading of the Bill of Rights while opposing a broader "moral" reading of the
constitutional design to determine the constitutionality ofjudicial "moral" readings
of the Bill of Rights).
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linked to legal conventionalism and constitutional stability, for emphasiz-
ing those traditional sources of law that have the strongest popular
sovereignty bases-such as text, historical context, and long-standing
constitutional traditions. Clearly, popular sovereignty is properly seen as
a foundational political norm-one of overriding importance-and is
viewed as such in the American political and constitutional tradition. It is
thus a highly attractive and authoritative ultimate interpretive ground for
legal legitimacy.
Why is this the case? First, popular sovereignty has an exceedingly
high value in light of widely-accepted principles of moral-political theory.
For instance, the relationship of the recognition of a right to equal political
participation to a view of the human person as a dignified, rational,
autonomous individual is strongly indicative of the value of popular
sovereignty, a democratic foundation for government and a basis for
fundamental political norms. 39 Further, the relationship of popular
government to the widely-recognized value of citizenship, civic virtue, and
civic participation also strongly supports the value of popular sovereignty.
Therefore, there is good reason to suppose that the principle of popular
sovereignty has a powerful and convincing basis in moral-political
argument as a basic source of political and constitutional legitimacy.
Second, the great value of this foundational norm is also widely
recognized in the American political tradition, from its very beginnings in
the colonial period to its ultimate flowering in contemporary America.
Indeed, who in the mainstream of the American political tradition would
deny that "all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the
People,"'41 that governments "derive[ ] their just powers from the consent
of the governed,"' 2 and that "[w]e, the People... ordain and establish"
constitutional government?43 Moreover, the great democratizing of the
American political system in the twentieth century greatly reinforces the
conclusion that ultimate political authority is vested inthe sovereignpeople
39 See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION: TEXTUALMEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110-59 (1999) (defending judicial originalism by
relating this interpretative approach to popular sovereignty and democratic theory);
Waldron, supra note 32.
4 See, e.g., RICHARD PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
41 VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. II, reprinted in THE GEORGE MASON
LECTURES at 20 (1776).
42 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
43 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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of the United States." Thus the strong moral-political value of popular
sovereignty is not only morally persuasive; it is also deeply embedded in
our political traditions. It is, therefore, unlikely to be seriously contested as
a foundational value in our constitutional debates.
Third, this "populist" understanding of the requirements of political
morality and the mainstream of the American political tradition is, not
surprisingly, also strongly reinforced by the text of the Constitution itself.
Indeed, a constitutional provision's status as supreme law depends
precisely on whether it was properly ratified by a supermajority of
American voters in conformity with the plain meaning of Articles V and
VII, provisions inextricably linking legal legitimacy to popular
sovereignty.45 Indeed, Article V is premised upon the foundational popular
sovereignty/democratic principle ofthe evolving American political ethos,
according substantially heightened moral-political legitimacy to laws
passed through this sort of supermajority process. The Constitution's
Article VII, setting the terms for adoption, was similarly rooted in the
sovereignty of the people. As Madison wrote in The Federalist: "The
express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the
Constitution." The language of the Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments reinforce the moral foundation of these structural
provisions. Several later constitutional amendments tend to confirm and
reinforce this reading by further democratizing the structure of the
Constitution through repeated expansions of the right to vote."
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 4, at 81-101 (discussing the democratic norms of
the Constitution).
I5 See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). Amar, for instance, observes
that "[b]y focusing exclusively on protections of minorities under our existing
Constitution, statistically construed, we risk missing the majoritarian character of
permissible change over the document, and therefore, the majoritarian character of
minority and individual rights." Id. at 1103.
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
4 The Preamble, of course, reads in part: "We the People of the United States
... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
U.S. CONST. pmbl. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." Id. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The Powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. amend. X.
" See id. amend. XV (prohibiting the use of race as a qualification for voting);
id. amend. XVII (providing for direct election of senators); id. amend. XIX
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It is justifiable to conclude, then, that the fundamental norm of popular
sovereignty (1) has great moral-political appeal, (2) is both deeply-valued
and widely-recognized in the American political tradition, and, finally, (3)
is strongly confirmed, substantiated, and reinforced by a simple "plain-
meaning" interpretation of the constitutional text itself (including, most
notably, the Constitution's adoption and amendment procedures).
Therefore, an interpretive methodology that closely links constitutional
meaning to the text ratified by the sovereign people, the range of under-
standings of that text at the time of ratification, and the long-standing
constitutional traditions that have since been accepted as legitimate will
togetherprovide ahighly authoritative reading ofthe constitutional design.
On the other hand, a method that links constitutional meaning chiefly to the
moral views of a given interpreter or the political practices of any set of
governmental actors simply has much less aclaim to constitutional respect.
V. A"PoPULIST" STRUCTURAL INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
A. Weighing the Basic Sources ofLaw
There is good reason, then, to give primacy to traditional legal
materials with strong popular-sovereignty pedigrees when interpreting the
structure ofthe Constitution. The chief question here, in order to determine
the best interpretation of the Constitution's design for government, is that
of how to weigh or prioritize these sources of law when they point in
conflicting directions. Indeed, if text, original meaning, original constitu-
tional practice, and innovative later practices point in contradictory
directions, how does one resolve the conflict?
B. Madisonian Interpretive Theory
In attempting to answer this question, it is worth examining what may
be called the "populist" approach that James Madison developed in the
1790s in response to early disputes about the meaning of the structure of
the Constitution. Charles Lofgren has provided a "capsule restatement of
Madison's [interpretive] views," including the following list of"essential'
guides to the meaning of the Constitution:
(granting women the right to vote); id. amend. XXII (providing Electoral College
representation for the District of Columbia in presidential election); id. amend.
XXIV (abolishing the poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (reducing the voting age to
eighteen years).
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1. The text, viewed always with an eye on the dictates of limited
government;
2. The deliberations in Philadelphia, insofar as they offer insight into
the way contemporaries not present, and not privy to the debates, would
generally have understood the final language of the text;
3. The commentaries and debates accompanying ratification, and
most especially ... those within the state conventions; and
4. Early and continued practice, particularly as a check on (but not an
invariable barrier to) subsequent reinterpretation.! 9
Madison's interpretive approach centered around (1) text, (2) original
meaning, and (3) "original practice." Why are these the touchstones of
interpretation for Madison? Madison begins with the text, trying to
construe it with an eye toward its purposes, principles, and structure. His
reasoning is obvious enough: The constitutional text is the best evidence
of its own meaning and, of course, has the sovereign authority ofthe people
who ratified it as a basis for its legitimacy.-' Madison next turns to the
"original understanding" of the text (again, for reasons that are obvious
enough): It was the Ratifiers who made a proposed constitutional provision
binding law, and therefore their understanding, to the extent it can be
determined, should govern later disputes about constitutional meaning."' In
particular, the original understanding is valuable in narrowing the range of
reasonable interpretations of the text, though it may often fail to provide a
single conclusive answer. Finally, Madison turns to the original
practice-the early, continuing constructions placed on the Constitution in
the actual day-to-day practice of government. Madison's reasons here are
grounded in the value of original practice both as strong evidence of
original understanding and as important legal precedent bringing stability
and harmony to the workings of government-the latter by settling
"doubtful or contested meanings."52 In particular, Madison maintainedthat
original practice as precedent should place definite prudential limitations
on later reinterpretations, favoring the "early, deliberate [and] continued
practice under the Constitution" to "constructions adapted on the spur of
" Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, in
INTERPRETINGTHE CONSTITUTION: THEDEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 117,141
(Jack Rakove ed., 1990).5oSee supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
SI See Lofgren, supra note 49, at 142.
521d. at 141 (quoting Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830),
reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370,371-72 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)).
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occasions, and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascen-
dencies."''
Even so, later reinterpretation at odds with original practice still might
be in order if it were necessary, in Lofgren's words, "to adhere even more
faithfully to the first three guidelines, and especially in order to observe the
'authoritative intentions... of the people of the States, as expressed thro'
the Conventions which ratified the Constitution."' A return to original
understanding, then, could justify an abandonment of originalpractice, if
the two happened to diverge in a particular case. Still, Madison-in
Lofgren's view-maintained that "[i]fpractice at variance with an original
understanding nonetheless continued, surviving with the long-term
acquiescence of Congress, this then evidenced the will of the sovereign
people" and would thus be considered legitimate.55
What, then, of the legitimacy of subsequent reinterpretation, which
breaks both with original practice and original understanding? Lofgren
summarizes Madison's position as follows: "[I]f the document as inter-
preted according to the intentions of those who made it an authoritative
instrument ceased to be adequate, then formal amendment, not novel
construction, was the remedy."-6 Clearly, Madison rejected innovative,
non-originalist constructions of the Constitution, maintaining instead that
constitutional meaning, "ifascertainedby contemporaneous interpretation
and continued practice, could not be overruled by any latter meaning put
on the phrase, however warranted by the grammatical rules of construction
... were these at variance with it."'' In short, Madison would have strongly
opposed any "reinterpretation" or "informal amendment" breaking with
both original practice and original understanding.
C. Informal Constitutional Change
Still, it is reasonable to imagine a Madisonian intepreter, if not
approving of such novel constructions, at least according them a limited
measure oflegitimacyunder certain circumstances. Plainly, the Madisonian




56 Id. at 139.
57Id. at 137-38 (quoting undated Letter from James Madison to Professor John
Davis), reprinted in 4 LETTERs AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 232,
242 (1884)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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at least somewhat, if such a reinterpretation did express the authoritative
will ofthe sovereign people. This is so because the Madisonian interpretive
approach is itself based upon the principle of popular sovereignty. If text,
original understanding, and original practice are valued as sources of law
because of their grounding in the popular will, there may also be reason to
value popular re-interpretations of the constitutional design. Why is this
important in this context? It is important because, the "role and power of
the [Supreme] Court" inthe American constitutional design have changed
dramatically over time,59 and that change is not clearly or firmly linked to
any formal amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, any legal-historical
analysis of the role of courts in the constitutional design must confront the
question of the legitimacy of various methods of constitutional change,
including the inevitable minor shifts in institutional powerrelations, formal
constitutional amendments, informal "amendments," and non-originalist
reinterpretations.
What of the legitimacy of various informal methods of constitutional
change? Of course, some degree of legitimate "change" in the constitu-
tional design may occur simply through the natural play in the joints of the
governmental structure. As Robert Bork has observed in his own brief
structural defense of(judicial) originalism, "[tihepolitical arrangements of
[our republican] form of government are complex, its balances of power
continually shifting."' Naturally, the legitimacy of these minor shifts
within the constitutional design are not in question, though their political
attractiveness might be. Legitimate change can also occur through the
formal amendment process provided for in Article V. Certainly, the
American people are entitled to alter the structure of their govern-
ment-and on several occasions they have done so.6' Finally, perhaps even
some dramatic, informal shifts in the constitutional design-whether one
thinks of them as informal "amendments" oras more drastic non-originalist
reinterpretations-may well become "legitimated" in some important
sense, at least if they are widely accepted by the American people for some
substantial period of time.'
58 DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 62 (3d ed. 1993).
59 Id. at 62-63.
60 BORK, supra note 4, at 153.
61 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; id.. amend. XVII (providing for direct
election of senators); id. amend. XXIII (providing for Electoral College
representation for the District of Columbia in presidential elections).
I See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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It is necessary to examine this last process in some detail. What, for
instance, of the legitimacy of fundamental but informal shifts in the
constitutional design, such as those that occurred in conjunction with the
dramatic expansion of federal economic and social regulatorypower during
the New Deal and second World War?63 It is possible to think of such
major alterations of the constitutional design as either informal "amend-
ments" or as drastic non-originalist reinterpretations, but the question of
legitimacy would remain essentially the same. Certainly, there is no easy
answer to this question, though we might imagine that if legitimization is
to occur at all it must be through some approximation of the federal-
ist/republican/populist requirements of Article V. The founding generation
recognized the necessity of constitutional change, and thus they provided
a formal method for amending the Constitution. Moreover, as a student of
The Federalist would expect, the formal amendment process was intended
to be highly deliberative. The amendment process is designed precisely to
promote the highest degrees of reflection, persuasion, compromise, and
consensus building-ultimately requiring supermajority support in both the
U.S. Congress and in the states. In short, it is a process intended (1) to be
consistent with populist, federal, and republican theory, and (2) to
encourage, via deliberation, moral reflection, prudence, legal-historical
continuity, and broad popular support.
An informal "amendment" to or structural reinterpretation of the
constitutional design could be considered "legitimized" in an important
sense, and thus "incorporated" into the constitutional design, to the extent
it approximates the requirements of the formal amendment process. Bruce
Ackerman has outlined his own understanding of an "alternative" informal
amendment process,' but there is no reason why it could not take a number
of forms and occur much more gradually. On this view, what would
ultimately matter is whether a solid, deliberate, supermajority consensus
has evolved around the alteration-to the extent that it could today pass as
a formal Amendment if necessary. An informal change in the constitutional
design that could meet this (admittedly high) standard would acquire, at
least, apartial share ofthe legitimacy accorded a formal change. Of course,
recognition of the legitimacy of "informal" methods of constitutional
change is dangerous to a degree, since such a practice may well encourage
circumvention of Article V and promote factionalism and constitutional
63For a detailed history and analysis of this period, and its social, political and
economic consequences in the ensuing decades, see MICHAEL BARONE, OUR
COUNTRY (1989).
6See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-70 (1991).
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instability. Still, a rigid originalist formalism that misses the important
organic nature of the Constitution and constitutional development has its
own significant dangers. The most obvious of these is the reduction of the
textualist-originalist approach to almost total irrelevance-given the high
proportion of contemporary constitutional practice incompatible with
original understanding-while missing the deeper implications of
originalism's populist justification, thus leaving the interpretive field
largely to implicitly anti-populist "political" readings of the structure of the
Constitution.65
If popular informal amendments or non-originalist, innovative
reinterpretations are accepted as legitimate in some instances, how may the
public's authoritative reinterpretation or informal amendments be
differentiated from the highly suspect, factional alterations rooted in the
vicissitudes of parties and personalities? Common sense suggests an
examination of several questions that arise in the context of a break from
both original understanding and original practice, including: (1) whether
the constitutional change was a self-serving one with respect to the
institution(s) that initiated it; (2) whether there is reason to think that the
change was driven in whole or in part by partisan, political, or factional
maneuverings; (3) whether the change was initiated by democratic
branches of government presumptively reflecting the will of a majority of
the American people; (4) whether the constitutional change involved a
process readily understandable to ordinary Americans and thus one likely
involving some high degree of informed popular consent; and, finally,
(5) whether the change has ceased to be controversial and has achieved
broad-based, long-standing, supermajority "populist" support such that a
formal amendment in favor of it would likely pass today.
Again, the reasons for this broad line of inquiry should be obvious. A
constitutional change initiated by an institution that benefits from the
change or seems driven by partisan politics or simple forum-shopping is
more likely to be a "factional" alteration "adapted on the spur of occasions,
' Originalists, of course, writing in the somewhat different context of
constitutional adjudication, usually approach this problem through the doctrine of
stare decisis. See BORK, supra note 4, at 155-59; SCALIA, supra note 24, at 139-41.
In the context of adjudication, originalists typically treat the question of when to
ovemle a mistaken decision as one of mere prudence. Given that popular
sovereignty is the argumentative force behind originalism as ajudicial interpretive
approach, it is worth noting here that contemporary "populist" support for an
earlier deviation from original understanding may be a non-prudential reason for
adherence to such a deviation.
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and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies"' of the
sort that should be discouraged in the interest of popular sovereignty and
constitutional stability.67 A change that is obvious and easily understand-
able is more likely to actually express "the will of the people"than one that
is subtle, complex, confusing, or subject to pretextual exercise. Obviously,
if an alteration in the constitutional design is suspect on any of these
grounds, or ifit threatens preexisting fundamental constitutional principles,
a high degree of long-standing popular support should be demanded before
according a change even a limited degree of legitimacy. To do otherwise
would simply be to encourage the sort ofpartisan "factional" alterations in
the constitutional design that Madison feared, undermining both the
democratic legitimacy and the long-term stability of the alteration.
D. Conclusion
The modified "Madisonian" populist structural-interpretive theory
presented here is ultimately grounded in a concern for the principle of
popular sovereignty as a foundational moral, political, and constitutional
norm. This approach recognizes that the status ofa constitutional provision
as binding "law" is rooted in its ratification in accord with the principles of
popular sovereignty reflected both in the text of the Constitution and in the
broadmainstream ofthe evolvingAmericanpolitical tradition. Thereliance
of this approach on extrinsic evidence of"original meaning" to narrow the
range of legitimate interpretations is grounded in the same overriding
populism rooted in morality, politics, law, and history. Finally, a limited
recognition of the legitimacy of popular, long-standing constitutional
practices deviating from text, original understanding, and original practices
is grounded in the same important source of ultimate constitutional
legitimacy. This modified Madisonian structuralist, textualist, originalist,
and evolving practice interpretive theory has as its underlying principle,
then, the idea of popular sovereignty-the notion that the Constitution is
fundamentally that of "[w]e, the [p]eople," and not that of federal judges
or any particular political, cultural, or financial elite class or faction.
Therefore, the structure of the Constitution should be interpreted in such a
way as to maximize this foundational normative principle and minimize
partisan and results-oriented manipulations of constitutional structure by
political factions.
6See Lofgren, supra note 49, at 141.67See id.
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Of course, such an interpretive theory is bound to be controversial in
a number of ways and at a number of levels, and space constraints do not
permit a full elaboration of its inevitable intricacies. Still, even someone
who disagrees with this particular interpretive approach must recognize the
importance of these basic sources of law to structural interpretation and the
serious moral, political, and prudential problems attendant to radical
structural deviations from our constitutional text, its originalunderstanding,
early constitutional practices, and true consensus-based evolving constitu-
tional practices. Any approach that does not seriously consider these
sources of law in structural interpretation undermines the popular
sovereignty-based legitimacy of the Constitution-as well as its status as
fundamental law-andthe stability of our constitutional order. These basic
sources of law must be examined in some detail in order to determine the
proper scope of the judicial power.
VI. THE "NATURAL" TEXTUAL
STRUCTURAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
A. Introduction
As described, any attempt to interpret the American constitutional
design must rely heavily on basic sources of law because of the importance
of the conventional understanding of law, the great need for constitutional
stability, and the foundational value of popular sovereignty." The primary
source of law in this context is clearly that of the constitutional text.
Therefore, what the "plain meaning" or most "natural reading" of the text
suggests about the architecture of the constitutional design, the role of
courts within that design, and the constitutional limits ofthejudicial power
is of great interest.
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, argues that the Bill of Rights, including
the Fourteenth Amendment, on "its most natural reading6 9 suggests a
concern with abstract "substantive" rights and, thus, in light ofMarbury v.
Madison"° and the growth of judicial power in American constitutional
practice, "seems to give judges almost incredible power."' It is certainly
worth following Dworkin's approach-if for no other reason than to test
his (quite counter-intuitive) conclusions. However, given that Dworkin's
6 See supra Part IVA-B.
69 DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 73.70Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
71DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 74.
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point is one concerning constitutional structure, one should actually raise
a slightly different textual question: Whether the design ofthe Constitution
as a whole-from its Preamble to its last amendment-on its most "natural
reading" accords federal judges a degree of power appropriately described
as "almost incredible. ' 2
It is also important at the outset to recognize the decided limits of such
a purely textualist approach. Indeed, a text-centered "natural" reading of a
document cannot go very far at all without placing the text-implicitly or
explicitly, consciously or unconsciously-in some sort of interpretive
context. In other words, what a particular interpreter may deem to be the
most "natural" reading of a particular text may, in fact, be simply a naive
or anachronistic reading driven less by the text itself than by the ideological
baggage that the interpreter brings with him. To some degree, then, a
"natural" reading ofatext serves as a political "ink blot" test, reflecting the
outlook of the interpreter as much as the "plain meaning" of the text.
Obviously, this is one ofthe reasons that textual readings tend to shade into
attempts to recapture the "original" textual meaning by reference to the
interpretive context that can be found in extrinsic historical sources. A
meaning that is obscure in modem context may in fact be quite "plain" in
its original context of the late eighteenth century. Even so, it is still likely
that a text may have a limited range of more or less "natural" interpreta-
tions. It is worth attempting, therefore, to examine the constitutional
text-with a fresh eye--in order to see what interpretation is most plainly
or naturally suggested.
B. The Philadelphia Constitution
What, then, is the most "natural" reading ofthe Philadelphia Constitu-
tion of 1787, from the Preamble to Article VII? As John Hart Ely has
pointed out, the constitutional text evinces, not surprisingly, an overwhelm-
ing concern with structural and procedural questions-as distinguished
from substantive "rights" questions.73 Moreover, the text on its face
demonstrates a clear concern with a number of structural constitutional
values, principles, and devices in direct tension with expansive judicial
power. Such principles include popular sovereignty, civic republicanism,
"federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism, representation, and
constitutional amendment"74 -constitutional features indicative of a plan
7 Id.
73 ELY, supra note 4, at 88-101.
74 Akhil Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132
(1991).
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of establishing democratic institutions, and diffusing and balancing
political power.' The facial commitment to these multiple constitutional
values alone, then, tends to undermine ajudicial maximalist textual reading
of the constitutional design.
Of course, it is possible that the apparent textual support of these
values is implicitly modified by an equally apparent textual support of
expansive judicial power. One might imagine that a natural reading of the
constitutional text would reveal its commitment to some form of delibera-
tive democracy but that this structural commitment, the argument would
proceed, should be understood in light of an equal and "modifying"
structural commitment to expansive judicial power. The two structural
commitments might then be seen as simply conflicting-or perhaps, when
rightly understood, complementary-constitutional values.
What, then, does the constitutional text suggest about expansive
judicial power? Is there facial textual support forjudicialmaximalism? The
obvious starting point is the text of Article I and its treatment of the most
conspicuous variables ofjudicial power. What is immediately striking is
that Article I contains no explicit mention of the linchpin of expansive
judicial power: judicial review. 6 In fact, not only is there no mention of
judicial review, there is, of course, also no mention of the crucial
"maximalist" doctrine ofjudicial supremacy, no mention of the status of
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution.'
What is found instead, in Article MI and elsewhere, is an array of serious
structural limitations on the power and independence of the judiciary. The
size of the Supreme Court is left to the discretion of Congress, suggesting
a legislative power to "pack" the Court." Funding for the Supreme Court,
IS See supra Part I. As noted above, of course, the degree and more precise
nature of the conflict between expansive judicial power and other fundamental
constitutional principles needs to be demonstratedthrough a careful moral-political
analysis. Space limitations preclude that demonstration here, but the conflicts, as
discussed above, are obvious enough and widely recognized.
76 The Constitution merely gives the Court the "judicial power" and extends that
power to cases "arising under this Constitution," a grant of power that does not
necessarily entail a judicial power to invalidate legislation. U.S. CONST. art. III.
I One, for instance, looks in vain for language suggesting that the judicial
power shall include the ultimate authority to determine the meaning of the
Constitution and that determination shall be binding on allbranches ofgovernment.
78 As Bernard Schwartz notes, the power over the Court granted to Congress is
such that "[t]he Court could not.., come into operation until the details of its
organization were provided by Congress. The Judiciary Act of 1789 set up a
Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices and set
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aside from judicial salaries, is left to the discretion of Congress. 9 The
decision whether to establish lower federal courts is wholly within the
power of Congress as well.80 Additionally, Congress arguably has the
power to strip the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction.8' Finally,
Congress has the power to impeach federal judges at its own discretion.s2
It is also "plain" that the Court has no enforcement or appropriations
powers of any kind and, again, that there are no textual provisions
suggesting that other political actors must defer to the Court's judgment on
constitutional questions or that they must use their powers to carry out or
fund its decisions.8 3 Indeed, the text of the Philadelphia Constitution,
viewed in isolation, is clearly suggestive of a weak Supreme Court with
very limited authority and of a very strong Congress with powerful checks
on the judiciary. That conclusion is simply by far the most "natural"
reading of the text.
forth the jurisdiction vested in it." SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 16.
" "Compensation" for the Justices is guaranteed. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
However, there is no provision that expressly provides other funding for the Court.
Congress could thus essentially defund the Supreme Court simply by declining to
appropriate funds for its operation.
o Id. ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested... in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
11 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("[Ihe supreme Court.shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.").
82Id. art. HI, § 1 ("The Judges... shall hold their offices during good behavior
."). Hamilton suggests in The Federalist No. 81 that:
There never can be a danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate
usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united
resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of
the means of punishing their presumption by degrading them from their
stations [through the impeachment power].
THEFEDERALISTNO. 81, at453 (AlexanderHamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
3 Again, no Constitutional provision, for instance, reads anything like: "The
President and Congress shall defer to the judgments of the Supreme Court as to the
meaning of the Constitution and shall use their executive and legislative powers to
carry out the Court's judgments." As Hamilton pointed out:
The judiciary... has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at433 (AlexanderHamilton) (ClintonRossitered., 1999).
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Of course, one can simply argue that the power of judicial review is
implicit in the text, that it follows from principles of separation of powers
and constitutional supremacy.' Indeed, one could even argue that ajudicial
power to engage in controversial "moral" readings of constitutional
provisions is also somehow implicit in the text, though the reasons behind
that view seem far from obvious.One could further argue that the text's
seeming support of deliberative democracy, federalism, separation of
powers, and other constitutional values must be understood as implicitly
limited by expansivejudicial power. Along the same lines, one could argue
that Congress's structural powers over the Supreme Court are implicitly
limited in some way by various structural concerns related to expansive
judicial power itself, judicial independence, and the constitutional norm of
separation of powers. Indeed, piling inference upon inference upon
inference, one could construct an argument for expansive judicial review.
In short, one could engage in a subtle, nuanced, and decidedly strained
reading of the constitutional text that would favor an expansive conception
of judicial power. Such a reading, however, is plainly not a "natural"
reading of the text, much less the most "natural" one.
In sum, the design for American government gleaned from the textual
face of the Philadelphia Constitution, given its more "natural" range of
readings, does not suggest a maximalist judiciary. Rather, it implies a
decidedly minimalist judiciary, perhaps one even lacking a. power of
judicial review beyond a limited departmentalist form.
C. The Bill of Rights
What, then, is the most "natural" reading of the text of the Bill of
Rights-the first ten amendments to the Constitution-particularly when
read "holistically" in light of the "background" text of the original
Philadelphia Constitution? Specifically, one must consider the substance
of the rights protected, though even more important is the basic structural
question of the role of the judiciary with respect to the Bill of Rights.
What, then, is the substance ofthe rights protected in the Bill of Rights
as suggested by the text? Ronald Dworkin concludes that:
On its most natural reading, then, the Bill of Rights sets out a network of
principles, some extremely concrete, others more abstract, and some of
near limitless abstraction. Taken together, these principles define a
" See, e.g., id. at 435 (indicating that the power of judicial review may be an
inherent part of the judicial power).
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political ideal: they construct the constitutional skeleton of a society of
citizens both equal and free. 5
In Dworkin's view, the text of the Bill of Rights displays serious concern
with non-structural, non-procedural, non-participatory (that is, "substan-
tive") rights, and is also quite compatible with a political morality centered
around "freedom" and "equality"--including, of course, contemporary
liberal individualism.
Other scholars, such as John Hart Ely and Akhil Amar, read the
substance of the first ten amendments as heavily structural and procedural
in nature, and as emphasizing democratic, republican, federalist, and
populist themes. These scholars, then, perceive the Bill of Rights as much
more consistent with the overall design of the Philadelphia Constitution.86
For example, Amar notes that the First Amendment freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, petition, and religion are all directly related to the
federalist and republican norms of the Constitution. 7 The Second, or
"Militia," Amendment is related to structural norms of populism, federal-
ism, and civic republicanism." Even the evident concern with juries in the
Bill of Rights is related to the populist and republican preference for
popular "representation" even in the judiciary.89 Finally, the Bill of Rights
"ends with back-to-back invocations of 'the people,"' found in the Ninth
Amendment's strong statement of popular sovereignty and the Tenth
Amendment's statement of popular sovereignty and fedealism. ° Amar,
therefore, concludes that "[t]he essence of the Bill of Rights was more
structural than not, and more majoritarian than counter." 91 In fact, Ely and
Amar both minimize the risk of ideological or anachronistic bias in their
interpretation by reading the Constitution "holistically"92 and by informing
their textualism with a substantial degree of historical context. In view of
the overarching design apparent on the face of the Constitution, this is a
convincing interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
85 DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 73 (emphasis added). Dworkin is referring to the
Fourteenth Amendment as well, but his own analysis makes clear that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause is, in Dworkin's opinion, "abstract" enough to
include the basic principles of "freedom" and "equality." Id.
6 See ELY, supra note 4, at 88-101; Amar, supra note 74, at 1205.
17 See Amar, supra note 74, at 1146-62.
98 Id. at 1162-73.
89 Id. at 1182-99.
9Id. at 1199-1201.
91 Id. at 1133.
92Id. at 113 1.
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What, then, is the most "natural" reading of the text of the Bill of
Rights with respect to the structural question of judicial enforcement and
judicial power? The striking point here is simply that there is no mention
in the text itselfofjudicial enforcement. The Bill of Rights simply does not
say that it is to be interpreted or enforced by the Supreme Court. Moreover,
it is also worth noting that a number of the amendments concern the inner
workings of the judicial process and thus display a serious distrust of the
federal judges necessitating citizen juries as a popular check on judicial
misconduct.93
Still, perhaps the failure of the text to mention judicial enforcement is
a red herring. Perhaps it is simply self-evident that the Supreme Court is to
be the primary interpreter and final arbiter ofthe meaning ofthe Constitu-
tion. And if not the Supreme Court, one might ask, then who would
interpret and enforce these provisions? Surely not Congress-at whom so
many of the Constitution's limitations are directed.
This line of argument, upon reflection, is actually very weak. As
pointed out, the most natural readings of the Philadelphia Constitution are
suggestive of a decidedly minimalist judiciary.9 This fact alone under-
mines any notion that it is simply textually self-evident that the Supreme
Court is to play a primary role in the enforcement of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights. In fact, it is not even clear, on a purely textual reading, that
the Supreme Court has the necessary power to enable it to play such a role
effectively. Nor is it clear that such judicial power would cohere with the
text's apparent commitment to other constitutional values such as
deliberative democracy, civic republicanism, or separation ofpowers. Why,
then, would anyone imagine that the text supports expansive judicial
power, a wide-rangingjudicial "veto power" over Congress? As described,
there is, in fact, nothing in the text of the Bill of Rights itself to support this
conclusion, nothing that actually supports even limited judicial enforce-
ment. Further, the multiple provisions displaying distrust of the federal
judiciary tend to further demonstrate that judges, as well as Congress, were
9' See Gerard V. Bradley, The Post-Constitutional Era, in REINVENTING THE
AMERICANPEOPLE 137,141 (1995) (arguing that a number of "amendments in the
Bill of Rights (the Fourth, much of the Fifth, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments) reveal a lack of confidence in the judiciary: they guarantee rights
within judicial proceedings" and provide that jury trials were "meant to be a
protection against government oppression of the people and an instrument of the
local community's selfgovemmenf '); see generally Amar, supra note 74, at 1181-
99.
' See also supra Part VI.
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viewed by the Framers as potential threats to the rights of individuals.
Therefore, when the text of the Bill of Rights is read holistically-and in
light of the background context of the Philadelphia Constitution-the
absence of a textual provision providing for judicial enforcement becomes
very telling indeed.
Moreover, a closer textual analysis combined with the broader
historical context suggests another possible source of interpretation and
enforcement of the Bill of Rights: the American people. As many writers
have observed, strong democratic, republican, and populist themes recur
throughout the document.95 Notably, the simple phrase "the People"
appears only once in the entire Philadelphia Constitution-in the
Preamble-but it occurs an additionalfive times within the short space of
the first ten amendments. In the view of Robert Goldwin, the Bill of Rights
established that the American people were intended to be "an integral part
of the Constitution, in a way they had not been before." Indeed, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, in particular, speak of the rights "retained" and
"reserved" by the American people against their government, includ-
ing-presumably-their government's judiciary. The text of the Bill of
Rights, then, is highly indicative of a "sovereign people" who have
established a limited government and delegated to it quite limited powers.
It takes no great leap of the imagination to suppose that the people
themselves, rather than another agency ofthe limited government, have the
responsibility for determining what rights they have "retained" and
"reserved." 7 This textual reading is strongly reinforced by historical
materials, as will be discussed.98
In sum, the most "natural' reading of the Bill of Rights suggests that
its provisions are heavily structural-procedural in nature, that they cohere
well with and reinforce the basic structural concerns evinced by the
Philadelphia Constitution, that they reinforce the multiple constitutional
values in tension with expansive judicial power, and that they are designed
principally to empower the sovereign people as opposed to unelected
federal judges. The Bill of Rights thus provides no affirmative textual
support for expansive judicial power. To the contrary, the document
displays a commitment to constitutional principles that expansive judicial
power tends dramatically to erode.
" See, e.g., Lofgren, supra note 49.
9 ROBERTA. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO PowER: HOW JAMES MADISON
USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 178 (1997).
97 See generally Amar, supra note 74.9' See discussion infra Part VII.D.
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D. The Fourteenth Amendment
What is the most "natural" reading of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Again, in this context, the substance ofthe rights protected is important, but
even more important is the basic structural question of the role of the
judiciary with respect to its provisions. As for the substance of the "rights"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, some ofthe language, such as the
references to "privileges or immunities," is indeed quite abstract in
character and suggestive of individual rights unrelated to governmental
structure. Even here, though, a "holistic" reading of the amendment might
suggest that its provisions should be seen as "echoing" the great structural
themes of the Philadelphia Constitution and the Bill of Rights. As John
Hart Ely suggests, it is reasonable to read these abstract provisions as
references principally to the dominant overarching populist, democratic,
and republican themes quite apparent elsewhere in the text of the Constitu-
tion. 9
What, then, is the most "natural" reading of the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment with respect to the structural question ofjudicial enforcement
and judicial power? Here, too, there is no language to suggest that the
judiciary is to have principal interpretive and enforcement powers, a failure
amplified significantly by the judicial minimalism apparent in the
background text of the Philadelphia Constitution. Moreover, even more
suggestive here is the fact that the text of section 5 specifies an institution
with the authority to enforce the Amendment's provisions. Section 5 reads:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."'1'0 Why then would anyone think that the most
"natural" holistic (or even clause-by-clause) reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment is suggestive of expansivejudicial power? It would seem the
contrary is true: In light of its own language and perceived against the
backdrop of the Philadelphia Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the most
natural reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it principally
empowers Congress-not the Supreme Court. As will be explained, this
"textual" reading is greatly reinforced when supplemented by historical
materials concerning the general lack of debate about the Amendment's
effect on republican government and the Reconstruction era Republican
Party's general disenchantment with the federal judiciary.'0'
9 See ELY, supra note 4, at 73-104.100 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
01 See infra Part VILE.
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E. Conclusion
Dworkin asserts that the Bill of Rights, on "its most natural reading,"
suggests a concern with highly abstract "substantive" rights and also that
structurally (in light of Marbury v. Madison") it "seems to give judges
almost incredible power."1"3 Inspired by Dworkin's textual analysis, one
can ask a slightly different but closely-related textual question involving
constitutional structure: Whether the Constitution, as a whole-from its
Preamble to its last amendment-and on its most "natural" reading, grants
"almost incredible power"° 4 to the U.S. Supreme Court. The simple answer
is that it does not.
On the whole, and by quite a margin, the most "natural" textual reading
of the structure of the Constitution is decidedly a judicial minimalit one.
The text of the Philadelphia Constitution displays a commitment to a wide
array of structural values in obvious tension with expansive judicial power,
displays no express commitment even to judicial review (much less to the
maximalist doctrine ofjudicial supremacy), and provides Congress with a
number of weighty checks on thejudiciary's power and independence. The
text of the Bill of Rights echoes many of these structural themes in tension
with expansive judicial power, evinces clear distrust of the federal
judiciary, and has no provision suggesting judicial (rather than popular,
state, or congressional) enforcement. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment
is emphatically not suggestive of expansive judicial power, as evidenced
by the absence of provisions concerning judicial enforcement and, as well,
by its direct express textual commitment to enforcement by Congress.
Finally, a series ofpost-Reconstruction amendments to the text have further
democratized the Constitution, undermining a textual reading in support of
expansive judicial power.0 s
Thus, while some form of judicial review may be a fair implication of
the constitutional text, the most "natural" reading of the constitutional text
as a whole strongly favors some form of judicial minimalism. These
conclusions are reinforced, quite dramatically, when the text is considered
in the proper historical context of its original range of meanings and the
original constitutional practices of the early American Republic.
'02Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
03DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 74.
104 Id.
... See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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VII. THE "ORIGINAL" STRUCTURAL
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
A. Introduction
The "original meaning" of the constitutional text is a second widely-
recognized and authoritative source of law, particularly in light of the
foundational norm of popular sovereignty, the authority of legal conven-
tionalism, and the important need for constitutional stability. Therefore,
conclusions about the "original meaning" of the American constitutional
design are highly relevant to structural constitutional interpretation. Of
course, it is also important at the outset to recognize the limits of this
approach. All one can expect here is to determine a limited range of
meanings more or less reasonably attributable to the Framers and Ratifiers,
as held either expressly or impliedly, in light of available historical
materials. There is certainly no reason to suppose that the founding
generation shared one highly specific view of the constitutional design, and
our historical source materials are imperfect, incomplete, and often
ambiguous-a fact that renders our conclusions on difficult constitutional
questions typically quite provisional. Even so, it can be demonstrated that
certain readings of the constitutional text, in all likelihood, fall within or
without the range of reasonably contemplated explicit and implicit
"original" meaning(s), and that demonstration alone is of decided value to
the interpretive enterprise."° The task, then, is to determine as much as
possible about the range of reasonably attributable "original" meanings of
(1) the "overarching" constitutional design, including the multiple
constitutional principles in potential conflict with expansivejudicial power;
(2) the role of courts within that design, including the logic of judicial
review and the multiple variables of judicial power, (3) the structural
1' For various defenses oforiginalism centering on adjudication and its use by
judges as an interpretive approach (but also substantially applicable here), see
generally BORic, supra note 4. For other discussions of originalism, see LOFGREN,
supra note 49; SCALIA, supra note 24; WHITTINGTON, supra note 39; CHRISTOPHER
WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (rev. ed., 1994); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Questfor the Orni'al Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980);
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections andResponses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original UnderstandingofOriginal Intent, in INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THEDEBATEOVERORIGINALINTENT 53 (JackN. Rakove ed.,
1990).
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dimension of the Bill of Rights; and (4) the structural dimension of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Founders' Original Constitutional Design
The Constitution's basic strategy for preserving individual rights is
quite evident in the constitutional text, the historical record, and documents
such as The Federalist. The strategy is chiefly a structural one, involving
the creation of representative institutions in order to protect the people
from governmental tyranny. This strategy also involves the careful
diffusion and balancing of political power among the institutions of
government. The Framers' intention here in part was to further weaken the
government to prevent tyranny as well as to slow down the political
process, to make it more deliberative, and to promote reflection, persua-
sion, compromise, consensus-building, and incrementalism.0 7 In fact, as
Michael Sandel has observed, in the early American Republic liberty was
simply "understood as a function of democratic institutions and dispersed
power.'
l08
The ultimate guarantor of individuals rights, then, on this view, is the
"sovereign people." Thus, it is not surprising that so many of the
Founders-including Madison, Jefferson, and Marshall--expressed their
belief in the crucial importance of fostering civic virtue in the citizenry in
order to maintain a free society."° The founding generation, therefore,
broadly recognized the importance of civic virtue--in addition to represen-
tative democracy and the dispersal of political power-to the preservation
of individual "rights." Indeed, in Madison's view the primary value of the
Bill of Rights was the educative value it would have with respect to the
citizenry as a solemn declaration of the basic political principles of
republican government."1 The Constitution's plan for protecting civil
liberties is, in essence, then, an attempt to promote just rule by the
"deliberate sense of the community""' through a combination of demo-
" See, e.g., CAREY, supra note 13, at 122-38. See also GEORGE W. CAREY,
THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (1989) [hereinafter
CAREY, THE FEDERALIST].
108 SANDEL, supra note 40, at 27.
109 See, e.g., AKHILREEDAMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 130-33 (1998).
o0 For a more comprehensive discussion of the educative function of the Bill
of Rights, see discussion infra Part VII.D.2.
" The phrase "deliberate sense of the community" is Madison's. THE
FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison) (stating that "the cool and deliberate sense
of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free
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cratic institutions, the balancing and diffusing of political power, and the
promotion of civic virtue among citizens.'
12
This concentration on an indirect "design" strategy is, of course, part
of the reason why the Constitution itself displays a clear textual commit-
ment to structural principles such as popular sovereignty, representative
democracy, separation of powers, federalism, bicameralism, and present-
ment, along with other forms of checks and balances. The design strategy
also illustrates the primary reason why structural debates about the
intricacies of the constitutional design dominated the Philadelphia
Convention, and were also the main source of contention in the political
struggles surrounding the Bill of Rights. The strategy is in fact embodied
in the Bill of Rights itself, in its important structural dimension echoing the
,"design" themes of the original Constitution."3 Finally, this overarching
structural strategy reveals why the Founders could confidently refer to the
judiciary as "the least dangerous"" 4 branch of the federal government; why
they could leave the question of the proper scope of judicial
power-including the existence of a power ofjudicial review-implicit in
the Constitution's governmental design. The Framers' simply did not see
the judiciary as the primary actor in the Constitution's structural plan for
rights preservation.
Therefore, one may conclude that the overarching constitutional design
of the Founders evinces a desire to instantiate participatory rights directly
and to protect non-participatory rights indirectly-through the establish-
ment of democratic institutions, the dispersal of political power, and the
promotion of civic virtue."' For instance, the structural constitutional
constraints on the exercise of the national legislation power demonstrate
precisely this strategy. The original constitutional design envisages that the
national legislative power is to be: (1) exercised by Congress, rather than
the President or the Supreme Court, in accordance with the constitutional
principle of separation of powers; (2) exercised by an elected and
electorally-accountable institution in accordance with the constitutional
governments ultimately prevail").
112 See CAREY, supra note 13, at 122-38. See generally CAREY, THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 107.
"
3 See generally Amar, supra note 45.
1 4 THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
"I For a broader discussion of the constitutional theory of the Founders, see
also JACKN. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
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principle of representation; (3) divided between two legislative houses in
accordance with the constitutional principle ofbicameralism; (4) exercised
only with the support of the executive or a supermajority ofthe legislature,
in accordance with the constitutional principle of presentment; and (5)
limited in its scope via the delegation and enumeration of powers to the
national government, in accordance with the constitutional principle of
federalism." 6 Without further elaboration, it is quite evident that the
exercise of legislative power by the national government is subject to a
series of important constitutional constraints of a structural-procedural
nature, designed both to confer participatory rights directly on citizens and
to protect non-participatory rights indirectly-these dual aims to be
accomplished by diffusing and balancing the power necessary to the
exercise of the legislative authority and by making such power accountable
to the people. As suggested above, expansive judicial power is in obvious
tension with this array of constitutional principles and values."
7
This important constitutional background sheds light on the original
understanding of the role of the judiciary in this constitutional design. In
particular, this structural background highlights the manner in which the
Court's exercise of the functional equivalent of broad discretionary
legislative power-unconstrained by the careful procedural-structural
limits the constitutional system places on Congress-is in conflict with
(and is thus a threat to) fundamental constitutional principles, the overarch-
ing structural integrity of the American constitutional order, and the
participatory and non-participatory rights of American citizens. The
important potential for conflict in these areas must be kept in mind as the
issues below are explored.
C. The Original Understanding of the Role of the Judiciary
What was the "original understanding" of the role of courts in the
American constitutional design? Of course, it would be more accurate to
.6 Another notable aspect of the original constitutional design assumes that
the state governments will-and are to a degree constitutionally required to--
incorporate similar structural principles into their own governmental structures. See
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Thus, the design of the Constitution also envisages that
these sorts of structural safeguards will be in place in thestate governments as they
operate in the federal system, and that the decentralized political power ofthe states
will follow similar constitutional procedures implicating democratic accountability
and dispersion of political power.
'1 7See supra Part III.
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say"original understandings," since there is no reason to suppose that there
was a simple consensus on the matter-or even, perhaps, that the matter
had been carefully considered at all. On the contrary, there was merely an
implicit understanding of what courts would and would not do in the
American system of government, in light of the traditional understanding
of the judicial function, and the basic structure and principles of the
Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the range of understand-
ings ofjudicial power in place at the time of the Founding and in the years
of the early Republic. This is most effectively accomplished by examining
the justification forjudicial review, the variables ofjudicial power, and the
actual exercise of judicial review.
1. The Original Justifications for Judicial Review
The classical justification for the original conception of judicial
constitutional review lies in two documents: The Federalist No. 78, written
by Alexander Hamilton, and Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison."' According to the classical view, the foundation of judicial
constitutional review is based on a simple syllogism: (1) it is the duty and
province of the judiciary to resolve legal questions; (2) questions of
constitutionality are inherently legal questions; and thus (3) it is the duty
and province of the judiciary to resolve questions of constitutionality.' 9
The heart of this justification rests upon an understanding of the nature of
the Constitution as a form of "law" and the function of the courts as the
chief "interpreters" of the law, and its logical force necessarily rests upon
a sharp distinction between law and politics-a distinction in which
Hamilton (and the Founders generally) very strongly believed.2 0 As
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19 In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton writes: "The interpretation of the laws
is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must
be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning... ." THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 101 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). In Marbury, Marshall writes: "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
"WIn fact, as Hamilton's writings suggests, judicial review was premised on the
(then) widely-accepted view that judging is purely an exercise of legal "judgment"
and not "legislative" will. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander
Hamilton). Indeed, the dominant understanding of legal interpretation of the day
generally held that there were "righf' answers to legal questions and that these
could be discovered without recourse to controversial moral and political
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numerous theorists have noted, the more one is inclined to believe that
constitutional interpretation necessarily is, or normatively should be,
suffused with moral-political judgment, the less force this argument
possesses.'
21
The preceding line of analysis is principally the basis for an argument
in favor of granting the judiciary the power of constitutional
interpretation. 122 Yet, a second question must also be confronted and
answered: How is the power of judicial review justified in light of the
competing constitutional and moral-political values that may be in potential
conflict with it? As explained, the initial line of argument in The Federalist
No. 78 bases the structural choice of judicial review on the obvious and
quite plausible grounds related to separation of powers, the judicial
function, and the institutional responsibility of the judiciary. In essence, the
classicists adopt the view that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts."''
Hamilton's argument does not end at this point but continues to
confront the crucial question of the compatibility ofjudicial constitutional
review with the overarching republican design of the Constitution. Indeed,
Hamilton concludes that such a power does not elevate the judicial branch
above the legislative branch in violation of the basic republican principles
for four reasons: (1) the Court is "designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature,"'24 simply enforcing the "superior"
constitutional will of the former on the latter;'2 (2) the courts are to
exercise the apolitical legal "judgment" of judges in determining the
meaning of the Constitution, and are not to exercise the political "will" of
legislators; 26 (3) judicial review is limited to "certain specified exceptions
judgments. See, e.g, WHITE, supra note 23, at 7-8.
121 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 24, at 147.
1 1 It is by no means clear that either The Federalist No. 78 or Marbury were
intended to assert anything more than alimited "departmentalist" understanding of
judicial review rather than a claim of judicial supremacy. In particular, Marbury
seems to be chiefly an argument that the Supreme Court does not have to defer to
the constitutional judgment of Congress, rather than that Congress should defer to
the constitutional judgment of the Court. See generally ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON,
MARBURY V MADISONAND JUDICIAL REvIEW (1989).




' Hamilton writes that the judiciary: "may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
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to the legislative authority" such as bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,
as well as to laws that are "contrary to the manifest tenor of" and demon-
strating an "irreconcilable variance" from such specific exceptions; 27 and
(4) the judiciary is the "least dangerous [branch] to the political rights of
the Constitution" and "can never attack with success either of the other
two" branches. 12
Thus, Hamilton premises his "compatibility" analysis on four grounds.
Namely, he relies on (1) a close link between popular sovereignty and the
meaning judges attribute to the Constitution, (2) the maintenance of a sharp
distinction between apolitical legal judgment and political will, (3) a
general policy of judicial deference limiting judicial review to manifest
violations of specific constitutional limitations, and (4) the relative
weakness of the judiciary, which renders any judicial "usurpation" of
political power unlikely. 29 Therefore, judicial review, even by electorally-
unaccountable federal judges, was not understood by Hamilton (or the
members of the founding generation who actually supported a broad
conception of judicial review) to elevate judges over elected legislators.
Indeed, this was so because judges were seen as simply enforcing the
"higher" will of the people-the Constitution-on either its "lower"
will-legislatures-or on rogue members of the government opposed to
both.
130
While Marshall in Marbury makes only a truncated version of this
Hamiltonian argument, there are no grounds for supposing that his
conception of the judicial power was any broader than Hamilton's
conception. Indeed, Marshall's argument is somewhat narrower in scope,
omitting any discussion of judges as a check on the popular passions that
might drive government officials to violate the Constitution. 3' Marbury
also involved a purely departmentalist exercise concerning the Supreme
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." Id. at 433.
'27Id at434-35. Indeed, Justice Chase, for example, endorsed a"clear-mistake"
doctrine as early as 1796, in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 171 (1796),
and in 1798 defined the meaning of ex post facto law in light of its technical legal
understanding in Anglo-American legal practice in Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 DalI.)
386 (1798).
'2 THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at 433-34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999).
129 For more extended analyses of this cluster of questions, see CAREY, supra
note 13, at 122-38, and CAREY, THE FEDERALIST, supra note 107, at 129-45.
130 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 115, at 336.
131 THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 469-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999).
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Court's own jurisdiction.132 Finally, while many members of the founding
generation may have had an even more modest conception of the judicial
role than did Hamilton and Marshall, few, if any, held a broader view.'
Indeed, then, the most widely held "original" justification for judicial
review in this era seems to have suggested a structural role for the courts
that was highly "minimalist" in nature. This minimalist view envisaged a
Court that would be politically vulnerable, deferential, apolitical, and
"legalistic," and an expounder of a constitutional law reflecting the
sovereign people's "higher" will. Under this view, the Court would
emphatically not be a strongly independent, aggressive, politically-
motivated, and"moralistic" institution making policy through creative and
highly discretionary constitutional interpretation. The range of "original"
justifications for judicial review, then, does not support an expansive
conception of the judicial power.
2. The Original Variables of Judicial Power
The above conclusions concerning the original theory of judicial
review are greatlyreinforcedwhenthe "original" set ofvariables ofjudicial
power are examined. Indeed, in discussing the role of courts in the
American constitutional design, it is crucial to pay careful attention to all
the variables of judicial power, since the actual scope of the judicial
function is in practice best seen as a result of a given combination of
them.3 I This broader perspective will provide a much more accurate view
of the actual scope of judicial power at the time of the Founding and in the
early days of the Republic than will a narrow focus on the interpretive
methods used by judges in a selected handful of cases. 13 Indeed, the
132 See, e.g., CLINTON, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133 See also RAOULBERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 322-36 (2d ed. 1997)
(arguing that the Founders denied the courts any role in policy-making).
"3 Nowlin, supra note 14, at 542-45 (arguing that an "awareness of the
importance of the numerous dimensions ofjudicial power for structural interpretive
analysis can help [one] avoid" fundamental structural errors such as an
overemphasis on judicial interpretive theory).
"I For instance, dicta involving the language of social compacts and natural
rights in early cases such as Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386 (1798), and
Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87 (1810), has been invokedby some theorists
as precedent bolstering the legitimacy of the discretionary use of political power
by courts in the contemporary period. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1127, 1176-77 (1987) (emphasizing
judicial discussions of "unenumerated rights" as precedent for expansive judicial
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exercise of judicial review is, in fact, affected by a number of factors
falling outside the realm ofjudicial interpretive theory. Many of these
variables have changed substantially over the course of American history,
suggesting that an approach centered purely on the interpretive methodol-
ogy of early American judges would be significantly flawed and would
present a highly misleading picture of the actual judicial role at the time.36
The most important "variables" of judicial power include the claim of
judicial review, the claim of judicial supremacy, the degree of judicial
independence, judicial-political deference, and judicial interpretive
theory.137 As argued elsewhere, 38 if the Court of today is compared with
the Court of 1800, a number of instructive changes appear indicative of a
great increase in judicial power since the early American Republic.
For instance, as of 1800, the Court had yet to establish with any
firmness or clarity even the bare doctrine of limited departmentalistjudicia
review. 39 Additionally, the proper scope of judicial review remained an
open question. In fact, the important "maximalist" claim regarding judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation remained quite controversial
until at least the last third of the nineteenth century.14 Moreover, it is far
from clear that Marbury itself stands for any principle broader than
departmentalist judicial review.14 ' It is worth noting, in particular, that
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Andrew Jackson, andAbraham Lincoln
all embraced various forms of "coordinate"or "departmentalist" review,
denying that the co-equal branches of government were uniformly bound
by the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations. 42
power while glossing over the general timidity of early American courts and their
sparing use of judicial review, particularly on questions involving individual
rights). Of cQurse, this language may well have been misinterpreted. See, e.g., ELY,
supra note 4, at 210-11 n.41 (noting that Calder, for instance, is in fact a fiercely
positivistic decision). In any event, the implications of this language for the
Founders' view of the judicial role is easily misunderstood unless a broader focus
on all the variables of judicial power, including consideration of the overall
fragility of the Court and its sparing use of judicial review, is maintained.
'3 See Nowlin, supra note 14, at 542-45.
137 See id.
1 See id.
"' This would, of course, come later in the form of Marbury v. Madison in
1803. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
140 See generally CLINTON, supra note 122.
141Id.
142SeeWALTERMURPHYETAL.,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION
267 (2d ed, 1995). This noteworthy group includes, respectively, the principal
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Moreover, the Court in the early Republic was less willing to challenge
the authority of legislative assemblies, and legislators tended to be much
less deferential to the Court. As early as the 1790s, Supreme Court justices
endorsed "clear mistake" doctrines and feared that controversial decisions
would meet with defiance from legislators-who might well question the
Court's authority or the merits of its particular decision. 1 3 These "clear
mistake" doctrines were often invoked and cited as "traditional" or
"universal" well past the year 1900.'" In fact, the actual exercise ofjudicial
review was infrequent in the early Republic, a rare rather than routine
event. 4s Additionally, the relationship of the Bill of Rights to the Court's
power ofjudicial review was unclear,14 and the Bill of Rights itself clearly
did not apply to state governments, which at this time held most of the
general legislative authority. 147 Further, the Court's political insulation was
subject to threat by the Congress, both through the impeachment power'
4
and the power to determine the number of justices staffing the Supreme
Court. 49 There was also some question as to whether Congress would
exercise its "exceptions and regulations" authority under Article III to
"strip"the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction on various controver-
sial constitutional matters.5 0
author ofthe Declaration of Independence, the principal author of the Philadelphia
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the leader of the first "populist" political
movement in the U.S., and the leader of the "second" American Revolution and
Founding.
141 See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796); James
Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope ofthe American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
14 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905) (Harlan, I.,
dissenting) (arguing that "the rule is universal that a legislative enactment, Federal
or state, is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question,
plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power").
'41 See infra Parts VII.C.3, VIII.B. 1.
14 See infra Part VII.D.
14' See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
" Hamilton viewed the impeachmentpoweras the ultimate deterrent to judicial
usurpations of legislative authority. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
149 See SCHwARTZ, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that the Congress determines the
details of the Court's organization and operation and that, for instance, the
"Judiciary Act of 1789 set up a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and
five Associate Justices").
"s0 See, e.g., id. Schwartz notes that the Judiciary Act of 1789 also "set forth the
jurisdiction vested" in the Supreme Court.Id; see also CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE
SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 48 (1963) (observing thatbetween 1821 and 1882 "[a]t
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Finally, as mentioned, it is also true that legal interpretation itself was
understood as an essentially apolitical, perhaps even mechanical,
"oracular' or "declaratory" enterprise.151 As Edward D. White has
observed, at the time of the Founding, "the predominant jurisprudential
assumption [was] that judges merely 'found' law, mechanically applying
existing rules to new situations," a view that fostered the widely-held
"image of judges as oracles who could discover the law's technical
mysteries but who could not influence the content of law itself."' In short,
judges typically were not seen, and typically did not see themselves, as
possessing any significant measure of discretionary political authority in
resolving constitutional cases. The legal "judgment" of judges and the
political "will" of legislators were thus seen as sharply distinct.
Again, examining this broader set of variables provides a much more
accurate picture of the judicial role at the Founding and in the early
Republic than does a narrower focus on the interpretive arguments used in
selected cases. This "original" set of variables makes it much easier to
understand why the Court did not strike down even a single law under the
Bill of Rights until as late as 1857'5 and why judicial review was a
relatively rare occurrence in American political life well into the late
1800s.1m In fact, as this arrangement of variables demonstrates, the
fledgling Court of the 1790s was in fact quite weak. Thus, one can well
understand why the first Chief Justice, John Jay, resigned to become
governor of New York,155 why Alexander Hamilton declined the opportu-
nity to fill his vacant seat,'56 and why another early justice resigned to
become a South Carolina state judge.'
In light of this "original" arrangement of the variables of judicial
power, there is no reason to doubt Alexander Hamilton's sincerity in
proclaiming the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch of American
government-as indeed it was, even as it gradually grew in power, for
nearly a century after the Founding.' Nor is there reason to doubt his
least ten proposals to restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction were
considered in Congress").
... WHITE, supra note 23, at 7-8.
152 Id.
"I Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
'54 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 344-45, 355-58
(1973); O'BRIEN, supra note 58, at 63-64.




I"8 THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
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sincerity in dismissing the concern that the Supreme Court would be able
to "abuse" its power by exercising political "will" in the place of legal
'judgment"--thereby encroaching on the constitutional authority of other
political actors.159 One is therefore quite justified in concluding that the
original set of variables of judicial power in place at the time of the
Founding was a highly minimalist one.
3. The Original Constitutional Practice ofJudicial Review
Ultimately, perhaps the best evidence ofthe original understanding of
the role of courts in the constitutional design may be the "original" practice
ofjudicial review-that is, the manner in which courts actually used their
power in the first several decades of the Republic. As the preceding
analysis suggests, the evidence is strongly indicative ofa highly minimalis
understanding of judicial practice."6 As discussed, the use of judicial
review was quite rare in the early Republic, and only somewhat less so
until the last decades of the nineteenth century. 6' Indeed, the Supreme
Court struck down only one act of Congress during the first fifty years of
its existence and invalidated only a small number of state statutes in the
same period.162 In fact, only since the late nineteenth century has the court
assumed what may be considered a "major" role in monitoring the
governmental process.163 As Robert Nagel has observed, the United States
"in the first half of its history saw very little judicial review and during the
second half saw it often exercised in lurching defiance of precedent." 164
Particularly jarring to contemporary sensibilities is the fact that the Court's
emphasis on "civil liberties" is an even much later, mid-twentieth century
judicial innovation. As Lawrence Friedman has observed, the Court's
putative role as the guardian of civil liberties-as opposed to defender of
federalism or property rights-is a "surprisingly recent" one. 165 Few
important decisions in the area of civil liberties precede the 1940s, and the
great majority date from the 1950s and thereafter.'6 It should be plain,
then, that analysis of "original" constitutional practice strongly suggests a
159 Id.
160 See supra Part VII.C.
161 See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 58, at 63.
162 See id at 62-63.
163 Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
164 ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POwER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER:
CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 33 (1994).
165 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 221 (1998).
16 Id.
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much more limited judicial role, including a more sparing use of judicial
review, greater deference to legislative majorities, and general avoidance
of controversial questions regarding individual rights.
In summary, the original justifications for judicial review, the original
variables ofjudicial power, and the originalpractice ofjudicial review in
the early American Republic reflect a (mutually reinforcing) "minimalist"
view of the proper judicial role in the American constitutional design. As
suggested, this conclusion is often obscured by a narrow focus on the
reasoning of a few atypical constitutional cases, a focus which misses the
larger systemic limits of the function of the Court in the American
constitutional system.1 67 Given the broader focus presented here, it should
be clear that the range of original understandings was highly minimalist in
nature: The Supreme Court was understood to be an institution largely
apolitical in its determination of constitutional meaning, decidedly limited
and deferential in its application of that meaning to other institutions of
government, andpolitically vulnerable as measured against Congress orthe
President. This original structural understanding of the judicial role and the
implicit recognition of (and respect for) a range of fundamental constitu-
tional values relating to representation, separation of powers, and federal-
ism thus strongly weigh in favor of a judicial minimalist reading of the
Constitution.
D. The Original Structural Understanding of the Bill of Rights
Given that enforcement of civil liberties has become both the dominant
interest and most controversial activity of the Court in the years since the
Second World War, it is certainly worth assessing the range of original
structural understandings ofthe Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Such analysis is relevant in that these provisions may reinforce or
undermine earlier conclusions about the original structural understanding
of the judicial role.
First, it is necessary to examine the original structural understanding
of the Bill of Rights-not so much to see what the Bill of Rights "means"
substantively but, rather, to examine generally what the Bill of Rights was
meant to "do" structurally. Among the important questions are the
following. What was the "original understanding" of the structural role or
function of the Bill of Rights in the constitutional design? How was it
intended to protect rights? Who was to interpret and enforce it? Was it
understood to confer additional powers on the federal courts?
67See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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1. The Founders' Emphasis on the Structure of Government
It is today often forgotten that the debates surrounding the Bill of
Rights were not, in fact, debates about "what rights people have," a
question on which there was a quite broad consensus at the time of the
Founding," but almost wholly discussions about the structure of the
proposed government. The question, simply stated, was this: To what
degree did the national government pose a threat to the rights of states and
individual citizens, and could a bill of rights ameliorate whatever threat it
might in fact pose?
69
Of course, the Federalists' common political argument against a bill of
rights was that such a document would constitute a meaningless
"parchment" barrier against governmental action in a democratic republic;
they thought that the best way to protect individual rights was rather
-indirectly through the structure of government itself.1 70 Indeed, as
discussed, in the "early [American] republic, liberty was understood as a
function of democratic institutions and dispersed power," not as a function
of enumerated lists of individual rights, to be enforced by powerful and
independent courts.' The proposed Constitution, then, was itself the
equivalent of a bill of rights, given the array of principles of limited
government it incorporated-representation, federalism, separation of
powers, bicameralism, and staggered terms are but a few.' 72 These basic
devices of limited government, the Federalists maintained, would insure
,that a citizenry of quite ordinary wisdom and virtue could select leaders
who would rule with reasonable prudence and justice, which would in turn
insure that the rights of both states and individuals would be protected 73
,61 See RAVOKE, supra note 115, at 290-97.
,6 9 See generally AMAR, supra note 109; GOLDWIN, supra note 96, at 179-80;
RAKOVE, supra note 115; SANDEL, supra note 40.
170 See, e.g., GOLDWIN, supra note 96. The other common Federalist argument
was a "legalistic" one concerning the potentially misleading implication that abill
of rights could have for the constitutional principles of federalism and the
delegation and enumeration of national powers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84
(Alexander Hamilton).
171 See generally SANDEL, supra note 40, at 27.
172 See THE FEDERALIsTNo. 84, at483 (AlexanderHamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999); Amar, supra note 74, at 1132; cf VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
supra note 41, at 20-21 (containing numerous structural provisions related to issues
such as popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and representation).
173 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 84, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999).
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Of course, it is also true that the Anti-Federalists' plea for a bill of
rights was largely structural in nature. 74 In fact, the Anti-Federalists'
complaints about the lack of protection for individual rights were largely
a cover for more searching structural objections to what they saw as a
dangerously powerful federal government. 75 As Michael Sandel has
observed, "[i]n opposing the Constitution, [the Anti-Federalists] sought to
limit national power, and they found in the [B]ill of [R]ights the most
popular, though not necessarily the most effective, way of doing so.'
' 6
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists often complained directly about the lack of
protection for states' rights, and many of the provisions eventually
incorporated into the Bill of Rights are in fact best read as federalist
provisions, which reaffirm the federal government's lack of regulatory
power over such matters as speech, religion, or the state militias, but which
do not alter the Philadelphia Constitution's actual design.'"7 Indeed, the Bill
of Rights can be read primarily as a "structural" document, echoing the
great design themes-deliberative democracy, civic republicanism,
separation of powers, and federalism-ofthe Philadelphia Constitution."8
Perhaps mosttellingly, theAnti-Federalists overwhelmingly disclaimedthe
version of the Bill of Rights that actually passed precisely because it did
nothing to alter the structure ofthe Constitution.'7 It seems plain, then, that
the significance of the Bill of Rights-in the eyes of the Founders,
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike-was substantially structural in
nature.
2. The Political and Educative Functions of a Bill ofRights
If Federalists and Anti-Federalists both agreed that individual rights
were best protected indirectly through the structure of government, what
value, if any, did they think a bill of rights might have? In answering this
question, two basic points must be kept in mind. First, the majority of the
founding generation was primarily concerned with the governmental
oppression of the governed, rather than with the modem focus on
majoritarian oppression of minorities. 80 Secondly, the vast majority ofthe
174 See SANDEL, supra note 40, at 35.
175 See id.
176 Id.
' See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom ofExpression, 84 COLUM. L.REv. 91, 119-21 (1985).
178 See Amar, supra note 74, at 1132.
179 See SANDEL, supka note 40, at 38.
"I See RAKOVE, supra note 115, at 336.
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founding generation certainly did not view the Supreme Court as a
powerful, benign vindicator of constitutional rights, but rather as a weak
(but still, perhaps, potentially tyrannical) branch of the federal
,government.18'
What, then, did they think was the value of a bill of rights? As Jack
Rakove writes, Madison's contemporaries-the Anti-Federalists and
Federalists alike-regarded the document as providing a set of standards
that would enable the people to judge the behavior of their governors and
"to know when their legitimate rights and interests were being violated."'8
In short, by far the most common view of the function of a bill of rights
was one that envisaged a set of standards that would allow the people to
judge whether their government was acting tyrannically. A bill of rights
was viewed as providing a standard ofjudgment and a rallying point from
which to oppose abuses of power. 83 It is also highly significant that the
judiciary itselfwas lookeduponwith skepticism. Indeed, as GerardBradiey
writes, many of the "amendments in the Bill of Rights (the Fourth, much
of the Fifth, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments) reveal a lack of
confidence in the judiciary: they guarantee rights within judicial proceed-
ings.""' In sum, then, the consensus understanding at the time of the
Founding of the value of a bill of rights was that it would provide a written
standard to judge whether the government, including the courts, was acting
tyrannically.
Moreover, this is precisely why Madison-and many other Federal-
ists-thought that a bill of rights had little intrinsic value in a republic,
given that "the people,"who would provide practicalpolitical force to abill
of rights, would also be in control of the government that violated it.
Clearly, ifthe efficacy of a bill of rights depended on rousing the populace
against itself, a bill of rights would indeed be a mere "parchment barrier."
In fact, Madison's primary motive for supporting a bill of rights was
clearly aprudential concern for national unity.18s Madison understood that
the primary problem facing the proponents of the Constitution, even after
ratification, was simply "the widespread public mistrust of the powers of
the new government it established.' 86 Madison, of course, felt this mistrust
18 Indeed, those who viewed, or claimed to view, the Supreme Court as a
powerful institution invariably were its Anti-Federalist critics. See Brutus, supra
note 1, at 162-87.
12 RAKOvE, supra note 115, at 336.
183 GoLDWIN, supra note 96, at 65.
184 Bradley, supra note 93, at 141.
"5 GOLDWIN, supra note 96, at 72.
116 Id. at 73.
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was unwarranted, but also knew that widespread support was essential to
the success of the new Constitution.'8 Therefore, he used the passage ofan
innocuous bill of rights, one that left the structure of the Constitution
unchanged, to assuage the public's fears-thereby "saving" the Philadel-
phia Constitution. 8
It must be noted, however, that Madison did concede two (relatively
minor) intrinsic benefits of a bill of rights.189 First, upon occasion, though
very rarely, the federal government might indeed engage in unpopular
"governmental" oppression, in which case a bill of rights would serve as
both a standard and rallying point to oppose oppression.' Second, a bill
of rights might have an educational, civic republican use in that it would
help to instill republican political values in the populace. 191 Madison
observedthat "[t]he political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire
by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free government, and
as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the
impulses of interest and passion."'" Or, as Rakove has put it, "Bills of
rights [in Madison's view] wouldbest promote the cause of republican self-
government if they enabled republican citizens to govern themselves-to
resist the impulses of interest and passion that were the root of factious
behavior." 93 Therefore, even in a government premised on protecting
rights through the mechanisms of democratic institutions and dispersed
political power, a bill of rights could render those protections more
effective indirectly by fostering civic virtue among voters.
Madison certainly did not see any value of a bill of rights in the power
it might be thought to confer on federal judges (he mentioned judicial
enforcement of the Bill of Rights only in passing), a point reinforced when
viewed in light of both the weakness of the judiciary and the shaky status
ofjudicial review in these early years. 194 On the contrary, Madison thought
that a bill of rights might have some value in its traditional and educational
functions, and that the "true benefits of a bill of rights" were to be found
solely in the latter. 95 Indeed, this conclusion is even further supported
when viewed against the era's background of general judicial quiescence
187 Id.
198 Id.
9 See RAKOVE, supra note 115, at 333.
190 See id. at 332.
191 See id. at 333.
' GOLDWIN, supra note 96, at 72 (emphasis added).
9 RAKOVE, supra note 115, at 336.
'9 Id. at 335.
195 Id.
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and political vulnerability, as well as concerns regarding judicial govern-
mental misconduct." Madison thus reflected the thought of his generation,
and that of several generations to come, in thinking that the Bill of Rights
was of limited substantive importance and would play only a limited role
in the protection of individual rights.
3. The Dormancy of the Bill of Rights
As with the exercise of judicial review, the Bill of Rights has also
increased dramatically in importance, rising up from its status as a minor
footnote to become the pole star of modem constitutional law. As noted, at
the time of the Founding, the Federalists largely considered a bill of rights
a superfluous "parchment" barrier and viewed its passage as inconsequen-
tial. 97 The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, were deeply displeased with
the Bill of Right's final contents, given that it did nothing to further their
actual goal of weakening the structure of the federal government, and
therefore denounced the document as worse than worthless. After the
document's passage, as James H. Hutson observes:
Federalists in Congress were not inclined to take much credit for a
measure they passed with so little enthusiasm, and their Anti-Federalist
adversaries wrote the Bill of Rights campaign off as a bad investment of
their time. Taking their cue from Congress, the state parties received and
ratified the Bill of Rights so unceremoniously that, except in Virginia, they
left scarcely any evidence of what they had done. The Bill of Rights
forthwith fell into a kind of national oblivion.., not to be "discovered"
until the beginning of World War II.19
Robert Goldwin is in accord:
[W]hen, finally, the ratification of the Bill of Rights was officially
announced, there were no great ceremonies, no glowing editorials, no
passionate speeches, no grand parades, no fireworks lighting up the sky;
there was nothing to indicate that anything had occurred that was more
' See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
198 JAMES H. HUTSON, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TIONARY EXPERIENCE, IN A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITCS, AND LAw-1791 AND 1991, 96-97 (Michael J. Lacey &
Knud Haakonssen eds., 199 1) (footnote omitted).
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consequential than the legislative acts concerning fisheries, fishermen,
post offices, and post roads. The Bill of Rights slipped quietly into the
Constitution and passed from sight and public consciousness until given
a new and very different life by the Supreme Court more than a century
later. 19
Indeed, for the next one-hundred and fifty years or so, the Bill of
Rights was "dormant," used by the Court only on the rarest of occasions,
until the eve of World War II. For instance, as Michael Sandel has
observed, "[d]espite the prominence of First Amendment rights in our
contemporary understandings of liberty, the Supreme Court did not strike
down a law of Congress for violating the First Amendment until 1965."2o
The centrality of the Bill of Rights to American constitutional law and to
the protection of individual rights from governmental action is, then, a
surprisingly recent constitutional innovation, one that dates largely from
the 1940s and 1950s. This novel constitutional practice displaced an earlier,
long-standing, andwidely-supported tradition ofjudicial non-enforceinent
of the Bill of Rights that had endured for nearly 150 years.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion, then, that the original structural
understanding of the Bill of Rights, as strongly supported by the "ori-
ginal" constitutional practice surrounding it, did not confer vast new
powers on the Supreme Court. Rather the document was intended to
emphasize, clarify, and reinforce the original structural principles of the
Philadelphia Constitution and to function in a primarily political and
educational manner. Of course, those structural principles, such as pop-
ular sovereignty, representative democracy, separation of powers, and
federalism, are themselves in facial conflict with expansive judicial
power.2 ' This suggests that the original structural understanding of the
Bill of Rights provides no positive support for expansive judicial power
and, in fact, to the contrary, demonstrates a commitment to architectural
principles of government in deep structural tension with such power. The
original structural understanding of the Bill of Rights thus lends strong
support to ajudicially minimalist structural interpretation of the American
constitutional design.
" GOLDWIN, supra note 96, at 175.
200 SANDEL, supra note 40, at 38. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965) (striking down § 305(a) of the Postal Service and Federal Employees
Salary Act of 1962).
" See discussion supra Part VII.C.3.
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E. The Original Structural Understandings of the Fourteenth
Amendment
1. One or Two Constitutional Revolutions?
In the search for a formal constitutional basis for sweeping judicial
power, one is naturally drawn to the Fourteenth Amendment. After all, the
amendment was ratified only a decade before the outburst ofjudicial power
in the late nineteenth century, was the textual basis for much of that era's
radically innovative use ofludicial review, and is today the textual basis for
much of the Court's most controversial jurisprudence. One might well
imagine that if the notion of expansive judicial power has any formal
constitutional basis, it is to be found here. Of course, any analysis of the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is greatly compli-
cated by the fact that the historical record surrounding its framing and
ratification is notoriously confusing, contradictory, and ambiguous. 20 2 Even
so, it is possible to determine some limited range of original understand-
ings reasonably attributable to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
given the values, principles, and goals to which they were collectively
committed.
Did the Fourteenth Amendment involve a conscious effort to confer
sweeping new powers on the federal courts, breaking with constitutional
tradition and altering dramatically the American constitutional design? As
Robert Bork has suggested, some constitutional theorists do seem to
suppose that:
[t]he ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment intended two constitutional
revolutions rather than one, applying the restrictions of the United States
Constitution to the states, which had not been done prior to the Civil War,
and also subordinating the legislatures of all the states, Northern as well
as Southern, to the uncontrolled discretion ofjudges. °3
Bork's point may be somewhat overstated, but the focus is, quite properly,
on crucial design implications-not on substantive protection ofrights. The
Amendment was passed in order to alter the federal structure of the
Constitution, to place important national limits on the exercise of state
police power, and (to some extent) to confer interpretive and enforcement
powers on a federal institution or institutions.
202 See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3, at 78.
20BORK, supra note 4, at 181 (emphasis added).
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Still, a much more specific question must be asked: How, if at all, was
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to alter the role offederal courts in
the American constitutional design? In particular, did the Framers or
Ratifiers of the amendment imagine that ratification would confer
important new discretionary political powers on the Supreme Court,
thereby endorsing something @kn to modem expansive judicial power? In
short, did these Framers and Ratifiers actually embrace expansive judicial
power despite the facial conflict between such power and both the
traditional logic of judicial review and other fundamental principles of
American constitutional government, such as popular sovereignty,
representation, separation of powers, bicameralism, and the principle of
checks and balances?
2. The Great Debate that Did Not Occur
At the outset, one can take note of a dog that did not bark. In discussing
the two possible constitutional "revolutions"-the first "anti-federal" and
the second "anti-republican"--Robert Bork has concluded:
We know the ratifiers intended the former revolution; there is not a shred
of evidence that they contemplated the latter. Had any such radical
departure from the American method of governance been intended, had
courts been intended to supplant legislatures, there would be more than a
shred of evidence. That proposal would have provoked an enormous




Bork is right on this point. Therewas, indeed, a great deal ofdiscussion
about the Fourteenth Amendment and federalism, but virtually none about
the Fourteenth Amendment, judicial power, andthe foundational principles
of American republican government.2 5 What does this suggest? If the
Fourteenth Amendment was thought to shift broad political power from the
state governments to the Congress, the only constitutional principle
substantially affected would be that of "pure" federalism. On such an
understanding, the Amendment would shift a number of state legislative
decisions to the national legislature, where they would still be made
consistent with basic constitutional principles of popular representation,
separation of powers, bicameralism, and presentment. Therefore, if this
was, indeed, the broadunderstanding ofthe Amendment, one would expect
2 Id. at 181-82 (emphasis added).
S ee generally CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1866).
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political debate to concentrate on the issue of federalism and federalism
alone. That is, of course, precisely how the debates played out.2°6
Moreover, if the Fourteenth Amendment were also thought to shift some
narrow quantum of power from state legislatures to the Court-without
discarding the notion that judicial interpretation and enforcement would
involve traditionally narrow, apolitical, deferential, and legalistic use of
judicial review--one would still expect political debate surrounding the
Fourteenth Amendment to concentrate more narrowly on the issue of
federalism, as it did, rather than generally on a broad range of republican
constitutional structures.
On the other hand, if the Fourteenth Amendment were thought to shift
broad political power from state governments to the Court-involving a
controversial, innovative, aggressive, politically-driven use of judicial
review-a wide range of American constitutional principles would be
significantly undercut. On this understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a large number of state legislative decisions would become discre-
tionary matters for the federal courts. Such a shift, however, would be in
open conflict with the republican principles of separation of powers,
bicameralism, presentment, and representation. It would, of course, also
raise serious questions concerning the traditional understanding ofjudicial
review-an understanding founded on a deferential, apolitical, and
"legalistic" treatment of constitutional questions. One would thus expect
political debate to concentrate on the entire range of issues surrounding
republican constitutional structures and an innovative judicial role raised
by such an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. That debate, of
course, did not occur.
Indeed, it is precisely because the notion of expansive judicial power
both deviates from the logic of judicial review and clearly undermines
these other basic constitutional principles that it remains so very controver-
sial today, where many jurists view it as an "illegitimate" usurpation of
legislative authority. Of course, expansive judicial power was terribly
controversial in the 1960s and (even in its somewhat milder earlier form)
in the 1890s. 207 There is, then, every reason to suppose that expansive
judicial power would have been terribly controversial in the 1860s-when,
it is worth noting, it would have been a much greater novelty and one
closely associated with the pro-slavery Dred Scott decision. Yet there is
simply no record of such a controversy, or, indeed, of any serious
discussion of the question at all-no discussion of the ramifications of
2M Id.
217 See infra Part VIII.
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shifting substantial legislative power from the state legislatures, which, like
Congress, are limited by traditional structural constitutional principles
associated with the legislative process, to the Supreme Court.
In short, there is no evidence that the Framers and Ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated any sort of "revolution" in judicial
power and republican government. If nothing else, they did not envision a
truly expansive-and thus a radically innovative-role for the Court in
contravention of the ordinary constitutional constraints on the exercise of
discretionary political power.
3. Reconstruction and the Background
Understanding ofJudicial Power
The conclusion above is further reinforced by the general historical
context of the passage and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Any
analysis ofjudicial power with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment has
to account for the "background" understanding of the judicial function in
the early American Republic-in general and in the Reconstruction era in
particular. As explained, the Philadelphia Constitution itself established a
"minimalist"judiciary, one relatively quiescent, deferential, andpolitically
vulnerable in nature. ° It is true, of course, that the Courts grew in power
substantially throughout the early nineteenth century, but it is also true that
during the ante-bellum period the exercise of judicial review at both the
state and federal levels was still a fairly rare occurrence.2° Moreover, the
Dred Scott decision and its aftermath, particularly relevant in the context
of Reconstruction, also very severely undermined judicial power in
American government by highlighting its potential for partisan abuse.
Certainly, as Lawrence Freidman has noted, "DredScott and after were
relatively dark days" for the Supreme Court.210 In fact, it is fair to say, as
William G. Ross maintains, that "the prestige of the federal courts
remained at a low ebb during Reconstruction."" Or as another leading
historian has put it: "Never ha[d] the Supreme Court been treatedwith such
ineffable contempt, and never ha[d] that tribunal so often cringed before
the clamor of the mob." Indeed, Robert McCloskey writes that "[a]n
o See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text
O'BRIEN, supra note 58, at 63.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at 378.
211 ROSs, supra note 12, at 7.
212 CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFrER LINCOLN
5 (1929).
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observer viewing the Court [in 1866] might have felt warranted to predict
that judicial review had reached its twilight period, that the Court's career
as an important factor in the American political process was drawing to a
close."2 13 Clearly, our attempt to reconstruct the original "structural"
understanding ofjudicial enforcement ofthe Fourteenth Amendment must
take into account the crucial structural context of a significantly enfeebled,
discredited, and demoralized Supreme Court, a Court that many considered
to be close to the very nadir of its power.
This point is greatly reinforced when one examines the views of the
men who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment on the issue ofjudicial power.
The Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, wholly a creature of the
Republican Party, whose members wrote it, ushered it through Congress,
and forced the occupied southern states to ratify it. Is it plausible, then,
that these Republicans were advocates of an innovative and facially anti-
republican judiciary? It is important to recall that the period from Dred
Scott through Reconstruction was an era of intense Republican disillusion-
ment with-and often outright hostility toward-the federal courts.
Abraham Lincoln's reaction to Dred Scott was typical enough. As
David Herbert Donald has noted: "So blatant was [Chief Justice Taney's]
misreading of the law, so gross was his distortion of the documents so
fundamental to American liberty, that Lincoln's faith in an impartial,
rational judiciary was shaken; never again did he give deference to the
rulings of the Supreme Court."214 In fact, Justice Benjamin R. Curtis
expressed the views ofmany Republicans on the question ofjudicial power
in his dissent in Dred Scott. There he denounced "political judging,"
observing that:
Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford rules ofjuridical
interpretation. They are different in different men. They are different in
the same men at different times. And when strict interpretation of the
Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation
of the laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are
allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are
under the government of individual men, who for the time being have
power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views
of what it ought to mean. When such a method of interpretation of the
Constitution obtains, in place of republican government, with limited and
2 13 MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3, at 121.
214 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINcOLN 201 (1995) (emphasis added).
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defined powers, we have a Governmentwhich is merely an exponent...
of the individual political opinions of the members of this court.
215
Moreover, Lincoln himself-in his First Inaugural Address-readily
acknowledged the threat that expansive judicial power might pose to
democratic self-government. He observed:
[The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government,
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed
by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary
litigationbetween parties, inpersonal actions, thepeoplewill have ceased,
to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their
government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
2 16
In fact, Lincoln seriously questioned the doctrine ofjudicial supremacy, a
crucial foundation ofexpansivejudicialpower, and maintainedthatjudicial
interpretations of the Constitution simply do not always bind the Congress
and President, outside of the particular case or controversy in question. It
is not surprising, then, that in 1858 he declaredthat: "IfI were in Congress,
and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be
prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would
vote that it should." 217 True to his word, Lincoln in 1862 gladly "signed a
law prohibiting slavery in all the national territories-even though the
Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision had declared such exclusion
unconstitutional."2 8 There is good reason to suppose that this rejection of
judicial supremacy was a common view in the Republican Party-at least
through Reconstruction.219
In fact, the Republican Party's affection for the Supreme Court most
decidedly did not substantially increase during Reconstruction. The Court
was seen as a threat to a number of the Republican "reform" measures,
including the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a threat which in fact prompted the
211 Scottv. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 620-21 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissent-
ing)).
216 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861 (Marion Mills
Miller, ed.).
217 SANFoRDLEviNSON, CONSTITUIONALFAITH 39 (1988) (quoting CREATED
EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 36 (Paul Angle
ed., 1958)).
218 DONALD, supra note 214, at 342.
219 See Michael McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique ofCity of Boeme v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 183 (1997).
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passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, those endeavoring to list
prominent critics of judicial power would have to reserve a special place
for the Reconstruction era Republicans, both radicals and conservatives,
virtually all of whom were severe critics of the Court. During Reconstruc-
tion, the Republican Congress both engaged in court "un-packing,"
reducing the membership ofthe Court from ten to seven (depriving Andrew
Johnson of the opportunity to appoint any new justices) and generally
"bullied" the Court, finally stripping it of its appellate jurisdiction in habeas
corpus appeals. The Court meekly complied, prompting one observer to
note that the justices had not "possessed half the nerve that belongs to
many ajustice of the peace." 2 ° Indeed, in early 1867, Rep. John Bingham,
the principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had issued from
Congress only six months earlier, proposed "sweeping away at once the
Court's appellate jurisdiction in all cases," if the Court were to interfere
with important Reconstruction measures.21 Bingham then furtherobserved
that:
[If] the court usurps power to decide political questions and defy a free
people's will... it will only remain for a people, thus insulted and defied
to demonstrate that the servant is not above his lord, by procuring a
further Constitutional Amendment and ratifying the same, which will defy
judicial usurpation, by annihilating the usurpers in the abolition of the
tribunal itself22
Indeed, in 1868, Bingham again "advocatedtaming the Court's power,"
this time "by requiring a two-thirds majority of the Court to strike down
congressional legislation," and "goaded his fellow members of Congress
to vote for the proposal by reminding them of the 'horrid blasphemy' of
Dred Scott." But Bingham was by no means alone. Other Republicans of
this era routinely attackedpolitical judging, questioned judicial supremacy,
asserted congressional supremacy, threatened the Court, and considered
and proposed radical structural measures to keep judicial power within
what they considered to be minimalist bounds. In sum, these facts are
plainly indicative of the Reconstruction era Republicans' general and
obvious opposition to expansive judicial power.
m WLLIAMH. REHNQUIsT, THE SUPREME COURT: HOWITWAS, HowITIs 311
(1987) (citation omitted).
221 See, e.g., ROBERTA. BURT,THECONSTITUTIONINCONFLICT208 (1992);see
also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 196 (1998).
222 See ACKERMAN, supra note 221, at 196.
" McConnell, supra note 219, at 182.
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It must be conceded, then, that-viewed against this background of
Republican hostility toward "activist" federal courts, Republican domi-
nance of Congress, congressional dominance of the government, and the
fact of a demoralized judiciary-it is hard to imagine that the Republican
Party's Fourteenth Amendment was understood structurally to confer
sweeping new discretionary powers on the Court. Most certainly, then,
Bork is right in observing that the amendment was not intended to
"subordinat[e] the legislatures of all the states, loyal Northern as well as
disloyal Southern states, to the uncontrolled discretion7'' 4 of the judiciary.
4. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, and Congressional Power
If the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood as principally
empowering the Supreme Court to protect the rights of individuals in a
politically discretionary fashion, what was it intended to do? First, both the
text ofthe Fourteenth Amendment and its historical background direct our
attention toward Congress as the preeminent, though not the sole,
constitutional interpreter and enforcer of the provision. In fact, the
Fourteenth Amendment itself states that "[tihe Congress shall have [the]
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."m Moreover, the historical event prompting the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment was congressional concern about the authority of
Congress to pass legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
concern that the Supreme Court would take the opportunity to strike down
the Act. Indeed, as Republican Senator Oliver Morton, a contemporary,
later explained: "The remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was
legislative, because in each the amendment itself provided that it shall be
enforced by legislation on the part of Congress." 6 Or as John Bingham,
principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment, put it: "The powers of the
States have been limited and the powers of Congress extended.' '2 7
There is, then, some good reason to suppose that the Republican
Congress wrote the Fourteenth Amendment chiefly to empower itse/f-not
4 BORK, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
225 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
McConnell, supra note 219, at 182 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 525 (1872)) (footnote omitted).
227 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 258
(1988). Foner in fact endorses a judicial supremacy reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while recognizing a significant role for Congress in its enforcement.
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the Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, many scholars share this view. For
instance, Walter Berns has concluded that Congress, not the Court, has the
proper authority to determine the substantive rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' William Nelson has also observed that "the
framing generation anticipated that Congress rather than the courts would
be the principal enforcer of section one." ' 9 Cass Sunstein notes that: "The
framers oftheFourteenthAmendmentwere entirely correct in thinking that
Congress, rather than the courts, should be the principal vehicle for
enforcement oftheFourteenthAmendment."' ' 0 RaoulBergerhas observed
that the debates surrounding the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
"indicate that the framers meant Congress to play the leading role."'23
Michael McConnell also maintains that "[t]he historical record shows
that the framers of the Amendment expected Congress, not the Court, to be
the primary agent of its enforcement, and that Congress would not
necessarily consider itself bound by Court precedents in executing that
function."3 James E. Bond has concluded that this was also the general
understanding of the highly reluctant Ratifiers in the defeated southern
states, who were generally much more concerned with the effects of
Congress's section 5 power than with judicial enforcement. 3 Addition-
ally, Christopher Wolfe has argued that the understanding ofjudicial power
in place in the nineteenth century requires the Supreme Court to grant a
presumption of constitutionality to both (1) state legislation potentially
violative of the Amendment and (2) congressional legislation purporting
to enforce the Amendment against the states.' Wolfe's view, then, also
suggests that Congress has potentially much broader interpretive/ enforce-
ment power than the Court? 5
228 WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONsTTUrION SERIOUSLY 209-14 (1987).
229 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 122 (1988).
230 CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 152 (1993).
231 BERGER, supra note 133, at 250.
23 McConnell, supra note 219, at 194.
233 JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 267-69 (1997).
2 WOLFE, supra note 106, at 141-42.
235 Id. at 141. Michael McConnell shares this view in cases where the institu-
tional-structural aspect of constitutional interpretation leads the Court to favor a
narrower reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protections. See
McConnell, supra note 219, at 156; cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) (holding that Congress's section 5 enforcement power is not limited to
remedial measures designed to correct judicially-determined violations of the
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5. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, and the Judicial Power
The fact that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that
Congress would be the primary agent of its enforcement does not, of
course, preclude a reading of the Amendment allowing for an important
degree of judicial enforcement. In fact, it is almost certain that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to have judicially-enforced substan-
tive content, and was intended in part to prevent any future Congress from
repealing the Civil Rights Act of 1866.? This fact, however, does not
change the essence of our "structural" analysis of the very limited nature
of the power conferred on courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever
the proper distribution of enforcement authority between the Court and
Congress, it is certain that the congressional Republicans of the Recon-
struction era did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment to confer sweeping
discretionary powers on the Supreme Court. In fact, congressional
Republicans declined to confer such powers even on themselves, the
elected and electorally-accountable Congress. Indeed, the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment quite specifically disclaimed the notion that even
the Congress had the plenary power to engage in a broad moral reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment; 2 7 even this branch could not simply "fill in"
whatever rights it happened to think were "fundamental" at any given time
but were, to the contrary, required to rely on the preexisting rights
established in the Bill of Rights, the common law, andtraditional American
political practice. 8 Such sweeping congressional power would have dealt
a fatal blow to federalism, one that even congressional Republicans in 1868
felt obliged to oppose. Indeed, as William Nelson observes: "Most
Republican supporters of the amendment, like Democratic opponents,
Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court, of course, has rejected this view in
recent years. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the
Supreme Court has the final interpretive authority with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment and that Congressional use of the section 5 power is limited to
proportionate remedial action designed to correct or preventjudicially-deternined
constitutional violations).
236 See, e.g., BURT, supra note 221, at 205-10. Burt emphasizes the "ambiva-
lence" of the Republicans of this era towards the Supreme Court inl868. He may,
however, overstate their overall support for judicial supremacy in light of their
broader views on the judicial role including their view of the propriety of
Congressional action limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. Eric Foner
makes an argument similar to Burt's. See FONER, supra note 227, at 257-59.
NELSON, supra note 229, at 114.
z McConnell, supra note 219, at 174-81
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feared centralized power and did not want to see state and local power
substantially curtailed... ."; therefore the Republican "[p]roponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment made it clear that they did not intend such vast
power for Congress."Y
9
Republican support for the constitutional principle of federalism thus
led them to support limits on the substance of the constitutional rights that
even the national legislature could "enforce" under section 5. It is therefore
quite unlikely, in the political context of the time, that the Reconstruction
era Republicans intended to confer sweeping discretionary political power
on judges, an act that would establish a radically innovative and extrava-
gantly expansive conception of national judicial power.
Indeed, if the Republicans' qualified concern for federalism led them
generally to disclaim plenary congressional power under section 5, it is a
virtual certainty that their unqualified support for the principles of popular
sovereignty, separation of powers, bicameralism, presentment, and
representation would also have led them to disclaim broad judicial power
under the Amendment. Moreover, total absence of debate on these matters
suggests that such an innovative conception of judicial power was well
beyond the range of viewpoints given even minor consideration during the
framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 If judges were
understood to play some major interpretive/enforcement role at all with
respect to the Amendment, it is also clear that that role must have been
understood as a structurally "minimalist" one.241 It is particularly worth
emphasizing that, even if one assumes (as seems likely) that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to incorporate the majority of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, those provisions themselves had not generally been
judicially enforced prior to the writing of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
only exception, Dred Scott, is a case the Reconstruction era Republicans
were unlikely to admire as precedent. Therefore, incorporation is not itself
in any way suggestive of expansive judicial enforcement.
Thus, regardless of how one views the substantive content of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its more specific structural implications, it is
quite evident that most expansive conceptions of judicial power (those
associated with the Lochner and Roe eras) are well outside the range of
reasonable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment's original
structural meanings. There is no evidence that the Framers and Ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to confer any substantial degree of
29 NELSON supra note 229, at 114.240 See supra Part VI.E.
24' See also WOLFE, supra note 106, at 140-43.
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discretionary political authority on the federal courts. In fact, as shown,
virtually all the evidence plainly points in the other direction. These
Framers and Ratifiers shared a traditional mid-nineteenth century
"minimalist" understanding of the judicial role, and were also deeply
committedto basic constitutional principles in conflict with such expansive
judicial power. In short, then, an analysis of the range of original structural
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment reasonably attributable to its
Framers and Ratifiers is strongly supportive of a judicial minimalist
reading of the structural dimension of the Fourteenth Amendment.
F. Conclusion
In conclusion, it is plain that the range of original understandings ofthe
structural plan of the Constitution strongly supports both judicial restraint
and republican constitutional principles in facial conflict with an activist
judiciary. It may be said, then, that the original understanding of the
American constitutional design lends no support to the claim that our basic
law grants expansive power to the judiciary. It is simply beyond dispute
that the Philadelphia Constitution was understood by its Framers and
Ratifiersto create only avery "minimalist"judiciary, ajudicial supplement
to a constitutional plan premised on protecting rights through democratic
institutions, broad dispersal and balancing of political power, and
cultivation of civic virtue among voting citizens. It is also clear that the Bill
of Rights was not understood to alter this structural arrangement by
conferring expansive powers on the judiciary; to the contrary, the document
was intended to implicitly reflect and reinforce the original design plan,
including the Philadelphia Constitution's commitment to constitutional
principles in deep tension with expansive judicial power.
Additionally, there is no evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was
understood to dilute, erode, or otherwise diminish the traditional constitu-
tional commitment to principles of popular sovereignty, representative
democracy, separation of powers, bicameralism, or presentment. Indeed,
it should be quite plain that the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood
to alter the "republican" character of the original constitutional design by
conferring new and "expansive" discretionary political powers on the
federal judiciary. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment's alteration of the
constitutional structure was limited to a change in the federal character of
the constitutional design, a change that chiefly provided Congress with
broader, though not unlimited, political authority to protect substantive
individual rights.
In sum, the range of "original understanding(s)" of the American
constitutional design, from its Preamble to its most recent amendments, is
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simply not supportive of the sort of modem expansive judicial power
underpinning decisions such as Roe v. Wade and advocated by constitu-
tional theorists such as Ronald Dworkin.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
A. Introduction
The most obvious response to the textualist, originalist, and early
practice interpretive analysis presented above is that it proves too much: it
suggests that even proponents ofjudicial restraint may have too expansive
a conception of judicial power. Indeed, the contemporary proponent of
judicial restraint typically supports a fairly routine use of a moderate form
ofjudicial review, judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights, and judicial supremacy in the area of constitutional
interpretation. Surely this fact suggests that the "populist" legal-historical
interpretive approach is seriously flawed or, at least, is impractical, given
entrenched modem constitutional practice.
There is, of course, much to be said for this line of argument. In fact,
contemporary proponents of moderate judicial restraint likely have a
substantially more expansive conception of the properjudicial role than did
most Americans in the 1870s. Even so, as discussed above, these facts do
not create a difficulty for the sort of "populist" structural interpretive
theory outlined herein; this is the case because of the openness of the
"populist" approach to evolving constitutional practice grounded in broad
popular support. Indeed, the structural interpretive theory defended in this
Article suggests that a natural reading of the text, the range of original
understandings, and original constitutional practices provide interpreters
with a crucial benchmark for evaluating the constitutional legitimacy of
informal innovations in governmental practice--those that may present a
deviation from or threat to fundamental constitutional principles. As noted
in the previous discussion of structural interpretive theory,242 such informal
constitutional change has been quite important in our organic constitutional
tradition and should be accorded substantial legitimacy to the extent it
reflects the long-standing, widely-held views of the American people.
Clearly, if popular sovereignty is the basis and foundation of the Constitu-
tion, innovations in governmental practice deviating from the text, original
understanding, and earlier practices may be accorded significant constitu-
242See supra Parts Ill-IV.
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tional legitimacy even if they present a serious alteration in the Constitu-
tion's basic principles, at least to the extent that the innovations have
achieved the status of genuine populist reinterpretations ofthe Constitution
and reflect clear or long-standing informed constitutional opinion.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the changing conceptions of the
judicial role reflected in our constitutional practices over the last two
hundred years. In particular, the proper inquiry is one that assesses (1) the
precise way in which judicial power has expanded over time; (2) whether
there is any suggestion of narrow, "factional" motivations underlying these
expansions; and (3) whether these expansions have achieved a degree of
informed, long-standing popular support. With respect to the second and
third points, of particular interest is whether there has been a vigorous
"counter-tradition" to these expansions, a movement undermining claims
that such expansions reflect the people's sovereign reinterpretation of the
Constitution as well as reinforcing the commonplace allegations that these
expansions injudicial power have been driven by the partisan motivations
of the various political "factions" in control of the judiciary at different
times.
B. The Expansion ofJudicial Power
1. The Original Minimalist Era
As discussed, it is quite evident that the exercise ofjudicial power has
changed radically since the founding.243 Indeed, the evolution of judicial
review has involvedboth an immense increase in the power of the judiciary
and an almost total re-orientation of its focus from questions of constitu-
tional structure to those of civil liberties.2" As noted, there was very little
judicial constitutional review until the late nineteenth century, and the
primary constitutional concerns of the court up to that time were issues
related to federalism.245 That state of affairs changed radically in the last
years of the nineteenth century, when the courts began to engage in much
more expansive exercises ofjudicial power and increasingly directed their
attention to governmental-business relations and traditional property
rights.
2
243Nowlin, supra note 14, at 556-57; see supra Part VII.C.
There was, of course, also an intermediate period of concentration on
property rights and government-business relations. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note
3, at 148-73.
245 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
215-21 (Revised ed. 1998).
' See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3, at 91-120.
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As David O'Brien has observed, only "[s]ince the late nineteenth
century [has] the Court... assumed a major role in monitoring the
governmental process." 2" Similarly, Bruce Ackerman has noted that
"[o]nly during the [post-Civil War] middle Republic did the Court begin
to review the constitutionality ofnational legislation on a regular basis; the
scope and intensity of its scrutiny of state legislation also dramatically
increased. 248
It is plain, then, that the first century of our constitutional prac-
tice-indeed our "original," early, and long-standing constitutional practice
-was a decidedly minimalist one in that it was characterized by the
sparing and deferential exercise ofthe power ofjudicial review. Of course,
this fact alone does not necessarily render expansive judicial power
illegitimate, but it should decidedly sharpen one's inquiry into the
legitimacy of the more grandiose conceptions of the judicial role that have
been asserted in the modem era.
2. The Lochner Era
As pointed out, it was only in the late nineteenth century that the courts
began to assume a role we can associate with the more expansive concep-
tions of the judicial power familiar today.2 49 A series of gradual changes in
the understanding ofthe American constitutional design, including boththe
variables of the judicial power and the constitutional design principles in
potential conflict with expansive judicial power, set the stage for this
controversial structural innovation. One of these developments was a
partial decline in the value accorded the constitutional principle of
federalism in the aftermath ofthe Civil War-the passage ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment is most reflective of the turning tide.250 Another important
development in this context was the gradual acceptance in the late
nineteenth century ofthe doctrine ofjudicial supremacy, the constitutional
status of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution?5' Even so, neither of these structural developments shouldbe
viewed as a rejection of or an attempt to dilute foundational republican
principles such as representation, separation of powers, or popular sover-
27 O'BRIEN, supra note 58, at 63.24 ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 63.
249 See supra Part VIII.B.1.
250 See supra Part VII.F.
251 See, e.g., BURT supra note 221, at 253 (noting that by 1905, "the doctrine of
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation was firmly entrenched").
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eignty-as the great controversy of the Lochner era expansion in judicial
power clearly attests. On the contrary, the evidence suggests instead that
these structural innovations were rightly seen as quite consistent with
traditional principles of American republican government, given the
implicit assumption that judges would engage in deferential, apolitical, and
legalistic interpretation of the Constitution. These innovations, then, were
not intended to alter the republican character of the constitutional design,
though unintentionally they did put in place much of the institutional
framework necessary for the expansion of judicial power in the Lochner
and Roe eras.
What has come to be known as "the Lochner era" dates from the
sudden and dramatic expansion in the exercise ofjudicial review in the late
1880s to its (temporary) demise in 1937 in the face of overwhelming
political opposition. The decisions of this era were notable both for their
radical use of judicial power and their conservative economic tenor. As
Lawrence Friedman has observed, "[h]eavy use of the fourteenth amend-
ment occurred only at the very end of the 19th century. In the first decade
of the amendment, the United States Supreme Court decided only three
cases; in the next decade, forty-six." 2 Even so, this was only the thin end
of the wedge. Between 1896 and 1905, the Supreme Court decided an
astonishing 297 cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment.P Friedman
concludes that "clearly the Supreme Court had developed a dangerous
appetite for power."24 And, as stated earlier, it was at this point, only
"[s]ince the late nineteenth century, [that] the Court has assumed a major
role in monitoring the governmental process..., regularly overtum[ing]
acts of Congress, of the states, and even of local and municipal govern-
ments." I5 Nor was the "Lochner era" confined solely to the federal courts.
In fact, as Friedman writes, "[state supreme court] review of state statutes
was a rare, extraordinary event in 1850; it was a common occurrence in
1900. What happened in the state courts paralleled what happened in the
federal courts. The taste for power was intoxicating ... ."2,6
As Christopher Wolfe has noted, decisions such as Lochner "easily
qualified the economic due process Court era as the most activist [up to its
time]. Never had the judiciary struck down so many laws with so slender
a constitutional basis for its holdings." Many of the most controversial
' FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at 345.
2m Id.
254 Id.
25 O'BRIEN, supra note 58, at 63-64.
256 FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at 355.
257 WOLFE, supra note 106, at 153.
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decisions in the federal courts centered around the Fourteenth
Amendment,15s and all were based upon a notion of implied individual
rights only tenuously connected to constitutional text, original understand-
ing, or judicial precedent. Indeed, such decisions were drawn from various
(often competing) strains of the American political tradition, including the
common law z 9 Lockean property rights,' the Founders' views of the
importance of property,2 61 the Jacksonian ideal of laissez-faire, 62 the "free
labor" ideal of the Whigs and Republicans,6 the Civil Rights Act of
1866,1" and influential new ideas such as Social Darwinism. 6 s The Court,
then, began to exercise its judicial power in an unprecedented aggressive
and politically-charged manner, striking down legislation at a much higher
rate than it ever had in the past and grounding its decisions only loosely in
conventional legal materials. Even so, it is highly significant that the
Lochner era property-rights decisions did at least have some claim of
resting specifically in American political traditions rather than in purely
innovative political ideas.
Not surprisingly, these decisions-economically conservative and
institutionally radical-were attacked by the center and left as a politically
motivatedusurpationoflegislativepowerby conservativejudges. 66 In fact,
the populist and progressive critics of this assertion made the judicial
258 Of course, a number of controversial Lochner-era decisions involved the
Commerce Clause.
2s9 See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORsTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN
ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 167-86 (1941).
2o See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATSES OF GOvERNMENT (1988).
261 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); THE FEDERALISTNO.
10 (James Madison); RAKOVE, supra note 115, at 290-97.
mSee, e.g., RICHARDHOFSTADTERTHEAMERICANPOLIICALTRADITIONAND
THE MEN WHO MADE IT 54-85 (1948).
20 See, e.g., id. at 118-74.
2 The text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads in part:
[C]itizens of the United States . . . of every race and color, without
regard to any condition of slavery or involuntary servitude shall have the
same right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property ....
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
1 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
I See generally ROSS, supra note 12.
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"usurpation ofpower"phrase very common. These decisions also provoked
a series of canonical dissents from the Court, opinions that endorsed a more
limited role for the Court in the interest of preserving the value of
constitutional principles such as representative democracy, separation of
powers, and federalism.6 Of course, eventually, the Lochner era ended in
defeat for proponents of expansive judicial power and laissez-faire
constitutionalism-the Depression andNew Deal ultimately discreditedthe
proponents of Lochner era structural and substantive doctrines.2  Conse-
quently, the Lochner era is quite dubious structural precedent for contem-
porary assertions of expansive judicial power offered in support of
innovative conceptions of civil liberties, given (1) the controversial nature
of the expansion ofjudicial power in theLochner era, (2) the era's focus on
"traditional" rights, (3) its focus on rights related to property and contract,
and (4) the wholesale repudiation ofthe Lochner constitutional philosophy
in 1937 by the New Deal Court and by later Courts.
3. The Roe Era
The federal courts, however, by the late 1940s began to reassert a more
"radical" conception of judicial power in the service of a new mission: the
protection of innovative, "progressive" understandings of the rights of the
individual, often against very traditional legislation.269 What may be
designated as "the Roe era," then, dates from the late 1940s to the present
day. The decisions of this era are notable for their renewed (and increas-
ingly) radical use of judicial power as well as their liberal social tenor.270
Civil liberties, as McCloskey has observed, were indeed the "interest that
was to dominate the third great era ofjudicial history."2 Again, many of
the most controversial decisions centered around the Fourteenth
Amendment-either directly oras a vehicle for the incorporation ofthe Bill
of Rights.P
Indeed, it is important to recognize that this new focus on individual
rights-unrelated to traditional property and contract rights-was in many
ways a startling innovation in American constitutional practice. In parti-
I See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see also WOLFE, supra note 106, at 160-61.
" See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3, at 108-20; SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at230-
45.
1 See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 106, at 241-91.
270 See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
271 MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3, at 122.
272 See O'BRIEN, supra note 58, at 261.
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cular, the Court routinely embraced "progressive" and highly innovative
conceptions of rights, often striking down laws that had been on the statute
books for fifty, seventy-five, or well over a hundred years.2 3 Courts in the
Lochner era, by contrast, had displayed a tendency to uphold long-standing
legislation and had limited themselves to striking down innovative
legislation in the name of traditional economic liberties-liberties that had
at least some sort of plausible connection to the common law, Lockean
views on the nature and importance of property rights, laissez faire
doctrines of the Jacksonians, Whig-Republican "free labor" political
origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus to long-standing political
traditions generally.274
The Roe era Court, however, reversed this trend, routinely striking
down traditional legislation in the name of innovative (and highly
controversial) social "liberties" and invalidating many laws that had been
onthebooks since the turn ofthe century-including laws that predated the
Fourteenth Amendment275 and even the Bill of Rights.276 The Court,
therefore, went from serving as a brake on social change to acting as its
catalyst.27 This implicit understanding of the courts as major agents of
social change represented an even more expansive conception of the
judicial role than that of the Lochner era.
The vast number of laws struck down and the Court's highly tenuous
legal basis of its rulings are quite startling indeed. The decisions of the
third great era in judicial history have been notable for their especially
radical take on judicial power and their liberal tenor on social issues. 278
Again, not surprisingly, these decisions have been attacked by the center
273 See, e.g., Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
274 See supra notes 249-68 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text. The Texas anti-abortion
statute struck down in Roe as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was in fact
"substantially unchanged" from its first enactment in 1857, nine years before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment See Roe, 410 U.S. at 175-77 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
276 Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, for instance, both
maintained that the death penalty was aviolation of the Eighth Amendment despite
both its broad political support and its history of long-standing use since well
before the ratification of even the Philadelphia Constitution. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,251 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at315 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
27See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 263.
S See SANDEL,supra note40, at 53,274-85 (discussing the liberal individualist
underpinnings of post-war American constitutional law).
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and the right as a politically-motivated usurpation of legislative authority
by liberal judges 9 These decisions also provoked a series of classic
canonical dissents, often echoing Harlan's and Holmes's classic dissents
in Lochner v. New York."' It is under these precedents-so very different
from our first one-hundred years of constitutional practice and even
significantly more "radical" than the fifty-years of the Lochner era-that
we live today. The legitimacy of this conception of judicial power, of
course, remains seriously in question.
C. Factionalism in the Lochner and Roe Eras
Is it possible that the Lochner and Roe era expansions in judicial
power-their radical break with the most natural reading of the constitu-
tional text, the original understanding, and most of our first century of
constitutional practice-may have been narrow "factional" alterations in
the American constitutional design driven by short-term political motiva-
tions? Indeed, what might have prompted the explosion in the use of
judicial review by both federal and state courts in the Lochner era? Aside
from the natural human desire for self-aggrandizement, it is not too simple
279 See BORK, supra note 4, at 69-100.
28o See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
id. at75 (Harlan, J., dissenting). White, dissenting inRoe, characterized the Court's
opinion as "an exercise of raw judicial power" unsupported by "the language or
history of the Constitution." Roe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting). He
further noted that in a case such as abortion where "reasonable men may easily and
heatedly differ," the "issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to
the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs." Id. at 222
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist in his Roe dissent noted that "[w]hile the
Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in [Lochner], the
result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority opinion... in that case."
Id. at 174 (citation omitted). Rehnquist went on to observe:
As in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process standards
to economic and social welfare legislation, the adoption of the compelling
state interest standard will inevitably require this Court to examine the
legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the very
process of deciding whether a particular state interest put forward may or
may not be "compelling." The decision here to break pregnancy into three
distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the State may
impose in each one, for example, partakes more of judicial legislation than




an answer to point toward the almost inevitable clash of the Gilded-Age
conservatism of Lochner-era judges with the economic liberalism of the
new agricultural, labor, populist, and progressive movements.' As
Friedman writes:
It was tempting for the courts to cross over from procedure to substance.
And the demand for the product was there. When a power bloc was
thwarted in one branch of government, it naturally turned to another. If
the legislatures were populist or Granger, there was always one last hope
for i railroad or mining company: the courts.282
Of course, judges of this era-overwhelmingly white, protestant,
native-born, upper-middle class, conservative, and pro-business-were
often only too happy to oblige.283 In particular, the Republican Party
engaged in a political about-face, over the course of two or three decades,
moving from a narrow conception of judicial power to one broader than
had ever been seriously advocated up to that time. 4 It seems very likely,
then, that if the dominant judicial class (at both the federal and state levels)
had found the legislation of this era less politically objectionable, the courts
simply would not have assumed such a radically innovative and intrusive
role. Even if one questions these judges' self-awareness and objectivity
(rather than their good faith), it is still fair to say that the expansion of
judicial power in the Lochner era was directly related to the class, partisan,
and ideological biases of those serving on the judiciary.
What might have prompted the reemergence of expansive judicial
power in the post-war years and in the 1960s? It is plain that the central
decisions of the Roe era reflect a highly controversial, moral-political
viewpoint-what is often called "liberal individualism.' '285 There is good
reason to link this viewpoint to the class, partisan, and ideological biases
of judges, lawyers, academics, and the professional classes more
generally. 86 Again, it is not difficult to connect this expansion of judicial
21 FRIEDMAN, supra note 154, at 362.
282Id. at 361.
283 Id. at 362.
4 See WOLFE, supra note 106, at 241-91
23' See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 40, at 4-5, 274-85.
16 For discussions of the question of social class and political outlook linking
upper-middle class professional values to social liberalism, see, for example,
STEVEN BRiNT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS
IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 81-103 (1994); ELY, supra note 4, at 58-59;
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS
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power to the inevitable clash between the social liberalism of the courts and
the social centrism and relative conservatism of the representative
institutions. It seems very likely that if the judicial "class" had found the
legislation of this era less objectionable from a moral-political standpoint,
the courts would not have (re-)assumed (and significantly extended) such
an intrusive judicial role in American government. It is fair to say,
therefore, that the sweeping expansion ofjudicial power in the Roe era was
directly tied to the class, partisan, and ideological perspectives of the
members of the judiciary.
It follows logically, that the establishment of the more expansive
conceptions ofjudicial power in the Lochner era (focusing on "traditional"
property rights) and in the Roe era (focusing on "progressive" social rights)
was, as the dissents of those eras so often attest,' severely tainted by
controversial political motivations. The holdings of these periods were, in
Madison's language, "adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the
vicissitudes ofpartyorpersonalascendencies."' ' 8 This fact shouldheighten
one's scrutiny of the question of the constitutional legitimacy of these
broader conceptions of the judicial role.
D. The Counter-Tradition ofDissent Against Expansive Judicial Power
1. Introduction
The vast expansion in judicial power, particularly since the 1880s,
should not blind us to the existence of a vigorous tradition against
grandiose conceptions of judicial power. In particular, since the 1890s,
when the Court abandoned the sparing use of judicial review and asserted
a much more politically-charged judicial role in "monitoring the govern-
mental process," 9 quite vigorous criticism of judicial "usurpation of
487-532 (1991); KISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
194-97 (1984).
1 One might note here Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 74-75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
has also observed that "[w]hen the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to
be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more specifically with the
Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the
Court's Members are drawn." Romerv,. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,
I., dissenting).
" Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert, supra note 52, at 370 (quoted
in Lofgren, supra note 49, at 141).
u90'BRiEN, supra note 58, at 63 (footnote omitted).
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power" has become a permanent fixture in public discourse. It is worth
examining, then, however briefly, both the judicial and political "counter-
traditions" of dissent against expansive judicial power.
2. The Judicial Tradition
As discussed, the judicial tradition of dissent against more expansive
conceptions of the judicial role is perhaps best viewed as a form of
"structural restraint"29 rooted in a "sense of the Court's appropriate place
in [the] constitutional design."' Indeed, the desire to reconcile the judicial
role with other constitutional principles is a recurring theme in the
American judicial tradition. Not surprisingly, then, a great number of
preeminent judges of the twentieth century endorsed judicial minimalism
(in one form or another and to varying degrees), including Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Louis Brandies, Learned Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix
Frankfurter, Hugo Black, John Marshall Harlan III, and Byron White.292 On
the present Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas also fall into this camp.
For instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes's celebrated Lochner dissent
remains a "canonical" statement ofjudicial restraint grounded in respect for
the democratic process ingrained in the constitutional design.2 93 As Edward
White has written, Holmes believed that "[e]ven on occasions when
precedents gave no guidelines, a series of institutional constraints derived
from [the] notion ofmajoritarian sovereignty limit[s] judicial freedom."
29
Learned Hand, perhaps the greatest American judge never to sit on the
Supreme Court, was also a "minimalist" and indeed a strong proponent of
what has been called a "radical doctrine of judicial restraint," a doctrinal
stance that amounted to almost "total abstinence" in the area of civil
liberties.29 Hand articulated strong civic republican objections to rule by
judicial "Platonic Guardians" in his brilliant essay The Bill ofRights,9 and
viewed progressive attacks on judicial independence as troubling but also
290 GLENDON, supra note 23, at 18.
291 Id. at 123.
92For a broad discussion of the classical conception ofjudging associated with
Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, and Frankfurter, see id. at 117-29.293 See id. at 122-23.
' WHITE, supra note 23, at 159.
295 Alexander M. Bickel, Judicial Restraint and the Bill of Rights, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 12,1958, at 16-17 (quoted in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNEDHAND:
THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 662 (1994)). See also WHITE, supra note 23, at 263-67.
296 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
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predictable responses to activist political judging.2 97 Felix Frankfurter was
a great admirer of Hand's jurisprudence and also clearly saw himself "as
the heir of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, the architects of a
passive model of appellate judging."2 98 In Frankfurter's view, if the
Supreme Court were to serve as "a revisory legislative body,"2 it would
sap the independence of legislatures and "mutilat[e] the educative process
of responsibility," thereby undermining the American system of govern-
ment °.3 John Marshall Harlan IT[, the "great dissenter of the Warren
Court,"3° ' also embraced a moderate form of judicial restraint, incorporat-
ing the "standard caveats about the unrestrained exercise ofjudicial power
that [has] characterized one strand of twentieth-century jurisprudence since
Holmes." 3°2 Byron White's jurisprudence also reflected a serious concern
with judicial restraint and a clear "structural" sense that the President and
Congress-not the Supreme Court-are to be the primary agents of social
change in the American system.30 3 Furthermore, the "originalist" interpre-
tive theory associated with William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Robert Bork is best understood as a means toward the end of
structural restraint.30 As Bork has written:
No other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to a
defined sphere of authority and thus prevent them from assuming powers
297 See LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to
Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND 163 (1953). Hand, for instance, observes that "[i]f an independentjudiciary
seeks to fill [the abstract language of the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth
Amendment] from its own bosom, in the end it will cease to be independent," that
the price of judicial independence is in fact that judges "should not have the last
word in those basic conflicts of 'right and wrong--between whose endless jar
justice resides.' "Id. at 163-64.
298 WHITE, supra note 23, at 331.
299 Id. at 327 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (June 5,
1923)).
3o Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court as Legislator, 46 NEW REPUBLIC 158
(1926) (quoted in WHITE, supra note 23, at 327).
3 1o See TINSLEYE.YARBROUGH, JOHNMARHALLHARLAN: GREATDISSENTER
OF THE WARREN COURT (1992).
302 WHITE, supra note 23, at 342; see also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW:
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 55-88 (1991).
303 See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZERWHITE: A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE (1998).
3 See DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 13, 271-75, 319, 335-54.
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whose exercise alters, perhaps radically, the design of the American
Republic. The philosophy of original understanding is thus a necessary
inference from the structure of government apparent on the face of the
Constitution.
3 05
One may note, as well, that as recently as 1992 fourjustices ofthe Supreme
Court were quite prepared to overrule Roe v. Wade on "structural restraint"
grounds relating to the proper limits of the judicial power.3 6 Finally, even
if the originalists of the Rehnquist Court have not always evinced the
degree ofjudicial restraint that the rhetoric of originalism may be thought
to suggest (or that many of their supporters may have hoped for),307 it is
still the case that there is currently not a single justice on the Court who
advocates a conception of the judicial role as broadly expansive as that of
Earl Warren, William Brennan, or Thurgood Marshall. All of these facts,
indeed, suggest a long-standing, strong, and vibrant force in the American
judicial tradition of opposition to the most expansive forms of judicial
power.
3. The Political Tradition
Even in the more "minimalist" pre-Lochner days, a large number of
America's greatest political leaders were critics of what they saw as an
overreaching judiciary, including, of course, Presidents Jefferson, Madison,
and Jackson. Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans of the mid-nineteenth
century were also outraged by the "maximalist," pre-Lochner Dred Scott
decision, and consequently viewed the federal courts with suspicion and
ambivalence for decades. With the advent of the Lochner era, the newly
imperialist Supreme Court soon found itself under fire from a number of
prominent progressive, populist, and unionist political leaders, including
William Jennings Bryan, Robert LaFollette, William Borah, Theodore
Roosevelt, and, finally, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Many of these "left-wing"
305 BORK, supra note 4, at 154-55. Whether originalism can always be applied
in a manner consistent with a "restrained" understanding of the judicial role is, of
course, a separate question, as is whether the preservation of the basic contours of
the constitutional design requires an embrace of Borkian originalism rather than
some more flexible and traditional form ofjudicial restraint. See, e.g., FRIED, supra
note 302, at 55-70; GLENDON, supra note 23, at 117-29.
31 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 6.
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critics of the Court called for fundamental structural change, even
supportingpopular referendums on judicial decisions andthe judicial recall
movement, though often only at the state level. Indeed, Bryan privately
favored election of federal judges and publicly favored recall measures;
LaFollette advocated allowing Congress to overrule the Supreme Court
simply by reenacting any federal statute declared unconstitutional; Borah
supported requiring a two-thirds majority of the Court to strike down
federal laws; Theodore Roosevelt defended the state recall by popular
referendum of individual decisions of state supreme courts; and, of course,
Franklin D. Roosevelt made a valiant attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court
by requesting Congress to increase its size to fifteen justices. °8
The reemergence of expansive judicial power in the post-war Roe era
(in evenmoreradical form) prompted anotherwave ofcriticism-this time,
predictably, from the political right .31 Indeed, the Warren Court's judicial
activism helped to divide the New Deal coalition in the 1960s, driving
many populists, communitarians, and social conservatives into the
Republican Party.310 It also inspired Richard Nixon to advocate what he
called "strict construction" of the Constitution3" and Ronald Reagan to
endorse "originalist" interpretative methods,"' both intended as means to
curb judicial discretion and limit judicial policy-making. Finally, the
Republican Party of the 1990s, following the lead of Nixon and Reagan,
remained steadfastly opposed to the most expansive conceptions ofjudicial
power and committed to the nomination of proponents ofjudicial restraint
to the federaljudiciary 13 Numerous neo-conservative communitarians and
31 For a detailed treatment of the populist-progressive tradition of opposition
to expansive judicial power, see ROss, supra note 12.
309 See supra notes 269-88 and accompanying, text
31o For discussion of the movement of many working class voters away from the
Democratic party in the 1960s and 70s, see E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS
HATE POLITICS (1991). See also LASCH, supra note 286.
311 For a discussion and critique of Nixon's position, see DWORKIN, supra note
35, at 131-49.
312 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13-21 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1990).
313 The 1996 Republican Party Platform reads in part: "[Tihe federal judiciary,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, has overstepped its authority under the
Constitution. It has usurped the right of citizen legislators and popularly elected
executives to make law by declaring duly enacted laws to be 'unconstitutional'
through the misapplication ofthe principle ofjudicial review." REPUBLICANNAT'L
COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, 1996 WL 489199, *52. The 2000
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left-wing populist intellectuals also oppose the judicial usurpation of
politis.31 4 All of these observations suggest a continuing, long-standing,
and vibrant strain in the American political tradition of principled
opposition to more expansive forms of judicial power. Of course, these
strong counter-traditions undercut substantially any claim that sweeping
judicial power has now achieved consensus-based popular support.
E. Conclusion
As discussed, our "original," early, long-standing constitutional prac-
tices were plainly "minimalist" in nature." 5 Indeed, the first century of
constitutional practice reflected a very modest, though gradually expand-
ing, conception of the proper role for courts, and one centered primarily
around questions of the structure of government such as federal-state
relations. This understanding of the judicial role was, in Madison's words,
our "early, deliberate & continued practice under the Constitution 31 6 for
almost a century. The Lochner era involved a sharp break with this long-
standing constitutional practice, dramatically expanding judicial power to
encompass a major policy-making role for courts in the American
constitutional system and reorienting the Court's docket toward questions
of property rights and government-business relations.1 7 Despite the
ultimate forcefulrepudiation of the conception ofjudicial power associated
Republican Party Platform reads:
The sound principle of judicial review has turned into an intolerable
presumption ofjudicial supremacy. A Republican Congress, working with
aRepublican president, will restore the separation of powers and reestablish
a government of law. There are different ways to achieve that goal-setting
terms for federal judges, for example, or using Article III of the
Constitution to limit their appellate jurisdiction-but the most important
factor is the appointing power of the presidency. We applaud Governor
Bush's pledge to name only judges who have demonstrated that they share
his conservative beliefs and respect the Constitution.
REPUBLICANNAT'L COMM., THEREPUBLICANPARTYPLATFORM, http://www.mc.
org/gopinfo/platform.
314 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999) (endorsing a constitutional amendment to abolish judicial review
of constitutional questions).
315 See supra Part VII.A-B.
316 Lofgren, supra note 49, at 141 (quoting Letter from James Madison to M.L.
Hurlbert (May 1830)).317See supra Part VIII.B. 1-2.
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with the Lochner era, the modem Roe era has involved an even more
dramatic expansion in judicial power and consequently has produced
another fundamental reorientation, this time toward controversial questions
of civil liberties.3 8 Moreover, both eras are strongly tainted by the
suspicion of narrow factional motivations linked to elite judicial disap-
proval of legislative politics, and both have faced vigorous opposition to
expansive judicial power--on and off the bench-by those rightly
challenging these expansions as illegitimate judicial usurpations of
legislative authority.3 19
Clearly, this radical and somewhat haphazard expansion in judicial
power constitutes a veritable revolution in the American governmental
practice, altering fundamentally the role of courts, the nature of our design
for government, the Constitution's basic plan for the structural protections
of rights, and the popular, republican, and federal character of the
American constitutional design. Moreover, while there is good reason to
suppose that routine use of judicial review and judicial enforcement of the
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment have today achieved some sort
of "populist" support, it is also obvious that the most expansive concep-
tions ofthejudicial role, includingtheuse of aggressive, politically-driven,
highly discretionary judicial "veto" power, remain very controver-
sial-rendering the charge of illegitimate judicial "usurpation of power" a
regular term of political discourse.
In particular, then, there is good reason to suppose that the most
controversial aspects of this expansion have seriously undermined the
Constitution's original strategy of protecting rights by establishing
democratic institutions, diffusing political power, and encouraging civic
virtue among citizens. As discussed, the exercise of such a sweeping
judicial power tends to erode fundamental constitutional norms and, for
these reasons, the exercise of such a power by the courts continues to be
contested as an illegitimate encroachment uponthe constitutional authority
of legislatures. In sum, the constitutional legitimacy of expansive judicial
power remains seriously in question.
IX THE ILLEGITIMACY OF EXPANSIVE JUDICIAL POWER
A. Text, Original Understanding, and Original Constitutional Practice
What can be said, then, about the constitutional legitimacy of this
expansion ofjudicial power, this fundamental transformation in our consti-
31
1 See supra Part VII.B.3.
319See supra Part VIII.C-D.
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tutional practices and constitutional design? A "populist" structural
interpretive analysis suggests that the answer can be found primarily in the
basic sources of law examined above: in the constitutional text, original
understanding, original constitutional practices, and innovative practices
demonstrating clear and long-standing populist support. At a minimum, it
should be clear that even without embracing some form of this Madisonian
"populist" structural interpretive theory, basic legal materials are highly
relevant to the legitimacy of the sort of informal constitutional change
represented by the expansion ofjudicial power. To what degree, then, do
basic sources of law such as constitutional text, original meaning, and
constitutional tradition support expansive judicial power?
A summation ofthe findings above is in order. First, the most "natural"
reading of the constitutional text certainly does not support expansive
judicial power. Indeed, the text ofthe Constitution does not even explicitly
provide for judicial review, much less establish the "maximalist" principle
that the judiciary is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution and
that its decisions are binding on the otherbranches of government. Further,
the constitutional text displays ample support for fundamental constitu-
tional principles-representative democracy, federalism, separation of
powers, and the like-that are incompatible with a highly expansive
conception of judicial power. Finally, the text is highly suggestive of a
wide array of congressional checks on the judiciary, such as those that limit
its power to make social policy. The text therefore offers no obvious
support for the claim that aggressive, quasi-legislative judicial interpreta-
tions ofrights provisions are constitutionally legitimate. The constitutional
text, as a whole, is much more suggestive ofjudicial minimalism than it is
of maximalism.
Secondly, the range of "original understandings" of the Philadelphia
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment do not
support the expansive Lochner or Roe era conceptions of the judicial role.
There is no significant evidence that the Framers or Ratifiers at the first or
second American Founding were proponents of expansive judicial power
or that they intended to entrench such power in the framework of the
American constitutional design. Further, the evidence suggests quite the
opposite, that in both the Founding and Reconstruction eras there was
general embrace of a minimalist conception of the judicial role and a
general concern about the compatibility ofjudicial review with traditional
principles of republican government. In short, there is considerable
evidence suggesting both explicit and implicit opposition to more
expansive conceptions of judicial power, evidence consistent with notions
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of basic constitutional principles. 320 Indeed, the rise of expansive judicial
power post-dates the ratification of the Philadelphia Constitution and-the
Bill of Rights by almost a century, and post-dates that of the Fourteenth
Amendment by at least two decades. The original understanding of the
judicial role, then, is much more supportive of judicial minimalism than
maximalism.
Thirdly, the "original" or early practices surrounding these texts do not
support more expansive conceptions ofjudicial power. The first century of
ourconstitutional practice clearly reflects highly "minimalist" understand-
ings of the judicial role.' Indeed, there was, in fact, very little judicial
review until the late 1800s, and almost no judicial review of rights
questions, aside from those involving property and contract, until the
middle 1900s.31 In fact, early American constitutional practices reflected
an "original" constitutional tradition ofvirtualjudicialnon-enforcement of
the Bill of Rights and a concomitant assignment of dispute-resolution
power over individual "rights" to elected legislatures.31 Again, the
evidence also strongly suggests that there was a tradition of firm positive
commitment to multiple constitutional principles in conflictwith expansive
judicial power.324 This suggests that the traditional judicial minimalism of
the early Republic was no mere happenstance, but was instead a logical
outgrowth of a particular understanding of the American constitutional
design. These facts, then, leave the highly expansive judicial power of the
Roe era--an expansion ofjudicial power in the area of civil liberties that
is scarcely over fifty years old-to stand alone and in obvious conflict with
the traditional understanding of the core principles of republican constitu-
tional government. The constitutional text, original understanding, and
original constitutional practices from the Founding until the late 1880s,
then, are all strongly supportive ofjudicial minimalism.
B. Innovative Constitutional Practice and Popular Reinterpretation
As argued above, however, even a substantial deviation from text,
original understanding, and original constitutional practice might be
accorded some significant measure ofconstitutional legitimacy ifit became
sufficiently accepted by the American people for a significant period of
320 See supra Part VII.
321 See supra Part VII.
31 See CLINTON, supra note 122, at 116-27.
32 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 133, at 155-97.
324 See supra Parts IV, VII.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
time to warrant recognition as an informal amendment or popular
reinterpretation of the Constitution. What degree of popular support, then,
have these more expansive conceptions of the judicial role achieved as
part of what we might call an evolving "populist" constitutional consen-
sus?
As noted above, boththeLochner andRoe eras were highly controver-
sial and the expansive use of judicial power was strongly contested by
major popular political movements.3z2 Of course, it should also be obvious
that more expansive understandings of the judicial role enjoy widespread
support today-whatever their actual structural grounding in text, original
understanding, and original practices. These include a more routine use of
judicial review, judicial supremacy, and judicial enforcement of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. These developments are also quite
consistent with moderate judicial minimalism as defined herein." What is
more important for purposes of this Article, however, is the equally
obvious fact that the most grandiose conceptions of the judicial role--those
associated withjustices such as William Brennan, decisions such as Roe v.
Wade, and theorists such as Ronald Dworkin-remain highly controversial
to this day. The reasons for this are not hard to fathom: expansive judicial
power is in facial conflict with foundational constitutional principles and
inconsistent with the basic logic of judicial review.327 Moreover, another
structural innovation-the rise of a truly robust conception of representa-
tive democracy expressedin several formal constitutional amendments and
in American political practices more generally-has also dramatically
increased the structural tension between expansive judicial power and the
democratic ethos expressed inthe evolving American constitutional design
and political tradition. Finally, popular acceptance of structural innova-
tions relating to routine judicial enforcement of rights provisions and
judicial supremacy lend additional support to the force of arguments
against an aggressive, politically-charged judicial role; these structural
innovations in fact greatly increase the nature of the threat posed by the
exercise of judicial political discretion to fundamental constitutional
principles.
Indeed, even a proponent of highly expansive judicial power such as
RonaldDworldn recognizes the profound differences between the rhetoric
and reality of our contemporary constitutional practices, a division rooted
in the fact that expansive judicial power is simply not accepted by the
3 See supra Part VIII.B.2-3.326 See supra Parts H, VIII.D.2.
327 See supra Parts II, VII.B.
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American public when its nature is stated candidly.3 Indeed, the tradi-
tional view of an "apolitical" Supreme Court remains the dominant
paradigm for public discussion of surrounding issues-such as the confir-
mation of Court nominees.329 Significantly, there is not a single justice on
the Court today whose vision of judicial power is as sweeping as that of
Earl Warren, William Brennan, or Thurgood Marshall 30 Finally, at least
one (if not both) of our major political parties clearly rejects a highly
expansive understanding of the judicial role.33 In short, it is apparent that
LochnerandRoe era expansivejudicialpowerhas alwaysbeen andremains
today a highly controversial matter politically.
Thus, only a limited part of this expansion in judicial power has
achieved anything like widespread, long-standing, "populist" support. At
most, the American people appear to support: (1) a moderate form and use
of judicial review, (2) judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3) recognition of the
principle of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. These are
important and beneficial constitutional developments and are quite
consistent with a republican understanding of the American constitutional
design, as well as with moderate forms ofjudicial minimalism as discussed
in this Article. It should also be clear, however, that "populist" acceptance
of structural innovations does not extend to expansive judicial power, as
defined here, which includes a majorjudicial role in policy-making in areas
of substantial political controversy. In short, then, the most grandiose
conceptions of the judicial role-those that envision decisions that are
highly political in nature, non-deferential in application, and only loosely
grounded in legal authority-not only deviate from the judicial role
established by text, original meaning, and original practice but also have
no firm grounding in long-standing, consensus-based, "populist," evolving
constitutional practice.
329 DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 3-7. Dworkin notes that there is a "striking
mismatch between the role the moral reading actually plays in American
constitutional life and its reputation," that it "is almost never acknowledged as
influential even by constitutional experts, and it is almost never openly endorsed
even by judges whose arguments are incomprehensible on any other understanding
of their responsibilities." Id. at 3.
329 See id. at 5-6. Dworkin notes that at confirmation hearings "[n]ominees and
legislators" all at least maintain the pretense "that hard constitutional cases can be
decided in a morally neutral way, by just keeping faith with the 'text' of the
document." Id. at 6.
330 In the opinion of the author, Justices Stevens represents the most restrained
of the old guard judicial activists.
331 See supra note 313, Republican Party Platform.
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C. The Constitutional Illegitimacy ofExpansive Judicial Power
What, then, of the ultimate constitutional legitimacy of expansive
judicial power? The essential issue of structural interpretation confronted
in this context is whether, broadly speaking, moderate judicial minimalism
or expansionist judicial maximalism better reflects the more authoritative
reading of the Constitution's design for government and the constitutional
limits of its implicit grant of the power of judicial review to the federal
judiciary. As shown, the judicial role evinced in the constitutional text, the
original understanding, and early constitutional practices is clearly a highly
minimalist one, and these sources of law also point to a strong constitu-
tional commitmentto basic principles ofrepublican government in obvious
conflict with expansive judicial power.
Therefore, the expansion of the judicial role over the last century has
plainly been an informal and irregular alteration in the structure of the
Constitution. As discussed above, ifa serious degree of force is given to the
foundational norm of popular sovereignty in structural constitutional
interpretation, then a legitimate informal alteration in the judicial role must
be a "populist" one and must stand as the people's reinterpretation of or
informal amendment to the formal Constitution. Such informal constitu-
tional change should be accorded some measure of legitimacy only if it
approximates the supermajority requirements of Article V, thereby
reflecting an evolving, informed, long-standing, popular consensus--one
that would support a formal constitutional amendment if it were actually
thought necessary.
Certainly, all of the factors discussed above suggest that expansive
judicial power has not and does not today reflect such a consensus, and
therefore cannot be considered a popular reinterpretation of or informal
amendment to the Constitution. Indeed, as discussed, the dramatic
alterations in the constitutional design in the Lochner and Roe eras were
initiated by unelectedjudges, self-serving in that they expanded the power
of the judiciary, and tainted by indications of dubious factional motiva-
tions. These expansions of judicial power were also highly contested,
drawing routine censure from contemporaries as anti-democratic, partisan
usurpations of legislative power. These expansive uses of judicial review
were also typically opaque in nature to the average American and often
concealed by the rhetoric of more traditional forms of legal interpretation.
Moreover, while, as noted, there is much greater political support today
than in times past for a more active federal judiciary, it is also plain that the
most sweeping, grandiose, imperial conceptions of the judicial role-those
associated with the Lochner decision, Roe v. Wade, and the Warren
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Court-remain highly controversial. Not surprisingly, then, a vigorous
judicial and political counter-tradition of opposition to more expansive
forms of judicial power has existed since the rise of the Lochner era and
continues unabated today. It is therefore simply indisputable that the broad
Lochner and Roe era conceptions of the judicial role are not predicated
upon any form of constitutional amendment and are far from attaining that
minimal degree of informal constitutional legitimacy justifying inference
of informal amendment to or reinterpretation of the Constitution. On the
contrary, Lochner and Roe era judicial power reflects highly contested,
narrow, factional attempts to alter the original constitutional design as
established by its text, original meaning, original practice, and our later
evolving consensus-based constitutional practices.
Further, as noted, while an extensive moral-political structural analysis
would be required to make more than a tentative judgment, there are quite
obvious moral-political reasons for thinking that a moderate form of
minimalism far better fits with the traditional overarching structural design
of the Constitution than does maximalism. In fact, the moderate minimalist
understanding of the judicial role complements rather than erodes the
Constitution's strategy of protecting rights by establishing representative
institutions, diffusing andbalancingpolitical power, andpromotingpopular
respect for constitutional principles. These observations together suggest
that any interpretation of the structure of the Constitution grounded in
traditional legal materials and sensitive to the integrity of the constitutional
design will endorse moderate judicial minimalism.
Clearly, then, given both the importance of traditional legal materials
such as text, original meaning, and original practice, and of very broad
popular democratic support for substantial informal alterations in the
constitutional design, sweepingLochner andRoe erajudicial power stands
on the shakiest of grounds. In particular, highly plausible charges of
partisan "taint" to the expansion ofjudicial power in these eras should lead
one to raise the threshold for determining whether and to what degree these
expansions have been legitimized by some form of popular "ratification"
via long-standing tradition of acquiescence. As James Madison argued two
centuries ago, we have strong reasons to prefer structural interpretations
firmly rooted in text, original understanding, and original practice-as
opposedto those rooted in laterpractices "adapted on the spur ofoccasions,
and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies."3 A
moderate form of judicial minimalism, then, represents by far the more
332 Lofgren, supra note 49, at 141 (quoting Letter from James Madison to M.L.
Hurlbert (May 1830)).
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authoritative reading of the American constitutional design. One is
therefore justified, on balance, in asserting the constitutional illegitimacy
of the most expansive forms of judicial power-those typically associated
with cases such as Roe, theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, and justices such
as William Brennan.
X. CONCLUSION
The question of the limits of the proper judicial role should be seen as
fundamentally a question of structural constitutional interpretation rather
than one of abstract moral philosophy or political prudence. Under the
American system of constitutionally limited government, the judicial arm
of the government cannot legitimately claim power that has not been
granted to it by the Constitution-even in the unlikely event that a careful
moral analysis ofthejudicial power were to suggest that the constitutional
design might otherwise be more attractive. Therefore, the "first-order"
structural interpretive question of the proper role for the Supreme Court in
the American constitutional design and the constitutional limits ofjudicial
review must be analyzed before answering "second-order" questions such
as how the Court should interpret and enforce the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Obviously, any authoritative interpretation of the
structure of the Constitution will have an important legal-historical
aspect-one requiring examination of legal materials such as text, original
understanding, original practice, and later long-standing, widely-supported,
constitutional traditions. Indeed, there are good reasons to follow a
"populist" approach in endorsing an interpretive presumption in favor of
those sources of law evincing a strong "popular-sovereignty" pedigree.
Moreover, even if design "populism" were rejected as the sole legitimate
interpretive approach, the obvious need for legal authority and constitu-
tional stability would continue to make a legal-historical analysis concen-
trating on text, original meaning, original practice, and evolving consensus-
based constitutional practices highly relevant to the determination of
structural constitutional meaning.
As indicated, constitutional text, original understanding, and original
practice strongly suggest that the constitutional design is best read as
reflecting foundational structural principles of popular sovereignty,
representative democracy, separation of powers, bicameralism, present-
ment, and federalism. Within this design, the Supreme Court was under-
stood to play only a modest role, using judicial review sparingly and
apolitically and showing great deference to the elected representatives of
the people, a role the Court generally played for a full century after the
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Founding. The Bill of Rights was also understood to play only a modest
educational and political role, remaining largely "undiscovered" and
unenforced by the courts until well into the middle ofthe twentieth century.
The Fourteenth Amendment was also understood to confer only very
limited additional authority on the Court, and was primarily intended to
alter the role of Congress and the federal nature of the Constitution while
leaving the system's overarching republican structures wholly intact.
Clearly a highly minimalist understanding of the proper judicial role, one
grounded structurally in constitutional text, original understanding, and
original constitutional practice, remained in place until the 1880s and the
rise of the Lochner era. With few exceptions, more moderate forms of
judicial minimalism remained the norm in the area of civil liberties until
well after the second World War.
Further, both the Lochner and Roe era conceptions of the judicial role
represent dramatic alterations in the original constitutional design. Both
conceptions were driven by "spur[s] of occasions" and "vicissitudes of
party" and were also contested by contemporaries asjudicial "usurpations"
of power. Moreover, while it is important to recognize contemporary
support for a more active and vigorous judiciary-support that rests on
public endorsement of a set of valuable constitutional developments now
deeply rooted in long-standing "populist" constitutional practice-highly
expansive conceptions of the judicial role remain extremely controversial.
Thus, the forms ofexpansivejudicialpowerunderpinningLochnerandRoe
cannot plausibly claim legitimacy as valid popular reinterpretations of or
informal amendments to the Constitution. To the contrary, such sweeping
conceptions of the judicial power are both highly contested and facially
incompatible with the populist/federal/republican structural logic of the
Constitution. These conceptions of the judicial role represent a sharp break
from authoritative legal materials and are the kind of narrow, politically-
driven, factional alterations in the structure of the Constitution that should
be discouraged in the interests of popular sovereignty, constitutional
stability, and the rule of law. Certainly, vicissitudes of parties and political
control cannot justify such permanent, drastic, and partisan alterations in
the constitutional design.
In the final analysis, then, a populist structural interpretive analysis of
the question of the proper role for courts in the American constitutional
design strongly suggests an embrace of a modest judicial role--one more
consistent with text, original understanding, and the first 100 years of
original constitutional practice. Such an "embrace" would move the
judiciary into a position of greater harmony with the overarching constitu-
tional structure of protecting rights through democratic institutions,
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diffusion of political power, and cultivation of civic virtue. Adherence to
moderate judicial minimalism would also bring the judiciary into greater
conformity with the moderate "minimalist" mainstream of our evolving
popular constitutional traditions, more in line with a broad contemporary
understanding of judicial power that enjoys long-standing, consensus-
based, "populist" support.
On this minimalist view, a proper exercise of judicial review-an
exercise within the scope of the limited power the Constitution grants to the
judiciary--demands that judges firmly ground their decisions in traditional
legal materials, minimize their political discretion, show considerable
deference to the judgment of democratic political actors, and enforce only
a set of reasonably "thin" and consensus-based constitutional norms.
Judicial decisions exceeding this scope of power-decisions that are only
very loosely-grounded intraditional legal materials, that involve substantial
judicial political discretion, that are driven by the personal political
preferences of judges, that show only very little deference to democratic
political actors, and that result in a set of quite "thick" and controversial
judicially-enforceable norms-are constitutionally illegitimate. In short, the
republican design of the Constitution, properly interpreted in populist
structural fashion, requires some formofjudicialminimalismandprohibits
judicial maximalism. A careful populist structural interpretive analysis of
the Constitution thus firmly establishes the constitutional illegitimacy of
expansive judicial power.
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